

LAIRD DISCLOSES SOVIET MIRV TEST

Says First Firings of SS-11 Are Proof of Momentum of Moscow's Program

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 26—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird disclosed today that the Soviet Union had conducted first tests of warheads on its principal intercontinental ballistic missile, the SS-11.

Mr. Laird said two of the missiles, which are comparable to this country's Minutemen, were launched Friday from the south-central part of the Soviet Union on a 5,000-mile flight into the Pacific test range 500 miles northwest of Midway Island.

Although they are not the first Russian tests of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, or MIRV's, they were cited as proof of a continued Soviet momentum in missile testing.

At a Pentagon news conference, Mr. Laird also made these points:

“The United States is committed to a neutral government in Cambodia. The statement appeared to broaden considerably the secretary's earlier comments on Cambodia and to buttress recent remarks by Vice President Agnew.

“The use of American air power in Cambodia to strike at enemy concentrations and movement of supplies “is a good use of military power in that area.” Mr. Laird said he would continue to authorize such attacks.

“The level of North Vietnamese and Vietcong activity in Cambodia has not changed significantly in the last three to four weeks, but the enemy has been unable to stage “significant action” in South Vietnam.

“The United States war casualty figure for last week will be the lowest since 1966. The precise figure, to be announced tomorrow, will be less than 59 deaths.

“The Pentagon is not prepared to accept the recommendation of a blue-ribbon reorganization panel calling for three new deputy secretaries, one of whom would be in over-

all command of military operations.

In telling of the Soviet tests, Mr. Laird said they could mean a step toward a significant increase in the number of warheads on each of the 700 SS-11's in the Soviet Union. The number of warheads could jump to 2,100.

The Russians are not believed to have MIRV's on their deployed missiles, but Mr. Laird said the testing program indicated that employment by 1972 “is still a very realistic projection.”

He cited a statement made last March to the House Armed Service Committee in which he said that, if they chose to, the Russians could have their first MIRV's by mid-1971.

The MIRV warheads can each be guided to a chosen target. In less advanced missiles multiple warheads are fired in shotgun fashion by missile.

Last June, the United States deployed its first MIRV's at Minot Air Force Base in North

Laird—The Defense Department plans to replace 500 Minuteman 1 and 2 missiles with the Minuteman 3, a MIRV with a triple warhead.

The SS-11's test-fired by the

Russians last week also carried three “objects” that landed in the water, according to a nearby United States ship that observed the test.

In commenting on American involvement with the present Cambodian government, Mr. Laird went beyond earlier statements on the subject.

“Our commitment,” he said, “is to a neutral government in Cambodia, and that commitment has not changed.”

On May 14, speaking to a group of reporters he said that the American commitment extended only to American forces.

“I don't believe our government has a commitment to Cambodia,” he said at the same time. “Our commitment is to our own forces and our commitment is to see that the objective we've set out in Vietnam is achieved, and that's where I put it.”

As for American bombing, he said he did not “care to get into a debate over the semantics of what our air power is doing in Cambodia.”

“The use of air power to interdict or to stop — other terms if you want to use them — materiel, personnel in Cambodia,” he said, “is a good use of military power in that area with the minimum possible American loss of life.”

Later, he said, “If we can destroy enemy supplies, destroy enemy troops in Cambodia with a minimum American casualty rate, I'm for it and I will authorize it.”

The Secretary thus avoided making distinctions, as he has in the past, over whether air power in Cambodia was to stop a flow of supplies, which is mainly high-altitude bombing, or to provide close air support, that is, air power used against enemy positions to support ground troops.

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N Y Times article

Times Erred in Report On Soviet Missile Tests

Because of an editing error, an article in the New York Times yesterday incorrectly stated that Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird had announced the first tests of warheads on Soviet SS-11 missiles.

It should have said that Mr. Laird disclosed the first tests of multiple re-entry vehicles—which may or may not have carried warheads—on the SS-11. Such test firings have been conducted before, but not on the SS-11, which is the Soviet Union's principal intercontinental ballistic missile.

It was also stated incorrectly that the tests involved multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, or MIRV's. In fact, Mr. Laird said it was too soon to tell whether the tests involved MIRV's or the less advanced multiple re-entry vehicles, which are called MRV's. Previous Soviet tests are believed to have involved only MRV's.

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of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

ABM

ARMS AND THE PEOPLE

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, since those two fateful days, August 6 and 9, 1945, when American planes dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States and the Soviet Union have engaged in what is potentially the most suicidal military struggle ever known to man. Like two mad, and often seemingly half-blind giants, they have piled nuclear armaments on top of nuclear armaments, and together have spent nearly a trillion dollars each in trying to get the better of the other.

The weapons that have been engendered by this mad race to see which nation can lure the other into the abyss are now many hundreds of times more destructive than those which in 1945 caused more devastation in a shorter length of time than the world had ever previously experienced. As if in a saga left over from the Dark Ages, the two powers seemed to have delighted in counting up their kilotons and megatons each night after the world had gone to bed and chalking up a victory sign at the birth of each new and more destructive weapon. The entire course of events for the innocent bystanders, that is, the people of the globe, assumed the dimensions of some vast cosmic nightmare in which humanity found itself again and again being hurled down into a chasm of hopeless destruction. Against the background of the awesome mushroom cloud, the cold war terrified people everywhere.

Always, good news for one rival power was bad news for the other; that we had the "bomb" made them want their own; their Sputnik frightened us; their alleged superiority in missiles made us not only seek to close the "gap" but to open it again—only in our favor; their ABM meant our MIRV and our ABM. The very terms "we" and "they," "ours" and "theirs," "us" and "them" seemed to provide sufficient justification for insoluble hatreds—insoluble except by our destruction of them, or vice versa: mistrust was the only apparent common ground between the two powers. It was a rivalry in folly.

There has been some progress achieved in retreating from universal Armageddon. Both the partial Test-Ban Treaty and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty are now in force. Also, the first bilateral treaty, the Consular Convention, and the Outer Space Treaty have been signed and approved by the Senate. Many cultural exchanges as well as some trade relations have been established. There is, thus, some small hope that other more positive steps will follow.

The "rite of passage" that may have launched us into adulthood was the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed on August 5, 1963, and ratified for the United States on October 10 of that year. As of the beginning of 1970, more than 100 countries were parties to this treaty. This is, by definition, a limited agreement, and its limitations have been well understood

by both sides; but it is nevertheless an important step toward full maturity. It has radically reduced the number of tests in which otherwise both powers would certainly have engaged. Our bombs and theirs, would surely now be more destructive were it not for the mutually accepted sanctions that the treaty enforced. But both would be less, not more, secure.

More concretely, by stopping atmospheric tests, dangers to the health of both nations, including that of unborn generations, have been radically averted. In the fifties and early sixties the most potentially dangerous augmentation of pollution over the surface of the earth was coming not from industrial wastes or other manufacturing processes, but from contamination of the atmosphere by radioactive fallout. True, it will be decades before the effects of bombardment from strontium-90, the deadly bone destroyer, will no longer be harmful. But iodine-131 has already virtually disappeared from our milk supply.

As chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, I remain acutely conscious of the dismal and unsettling fact that the nuclear arms race continues and that negotiations with the Soviets remain problematic. If one must resolve this dilemma, as one must, it can only be through the realization that excessive caution ought never to jeopardize reasonable negotiations.

And I am profoundly convinced that any such future negotiations are in grave danger of being undermined by insistent proposals for the deployment of an antiballistic missile weapons system. I have, therefore, publicly deplored and criticized the decision of the Nixon administration to snatch up this discredited and partially discarded Johnson program. To me such an action was tantamount to turning back the clock, and meant a step away from arms control and perhaps, therefore, from peace.

President Johnson had recommended an ABM system—called the "Sentinel"—as a possible defense against a Chinese missile attack. The idea was not well received in the area of three of our larger cities, around Boston, Chicago, and Seattle. City dwellers and suburbanites alike, who were not much impressed by the imminence of the Chinese threat, did not want nuclear weapons installations of questionable effectiveness, and possible accidental dangers, cluttering up their landscapes. President Johnson's successor hoped to sell his product under the brand name "Safeguard" a more appealing label, it was thought, than "Sentinel." If space allowed, one might profitably digress here on the need for a truth-in-packaging law since, thus far, Mr. Nixon has not made clear whether his more or less "invisible shield" of ABM's will in fact safeguard us against Russia, against China, or against the accidental firing of a missile by someone unknown. He has thus far not even settled on whether his system is to be an area defense, "thin" or "thick"—as the strategists say—or merely a "spot" safeguard for a few of our offensive missiles.

I have referred to President Nixon and

"his" system, but perhaps I should more accurately refer to it as the Pentagon's project. But, of course, as always, it is the people's system—in fact their millstone. The cost has been estimated at upwards of \$8 billion for the original "teaser" system, while a defense system even partially effective against any conceivable attack would cost truly astronomical amounts.

It was against this background of confusion and contradiction, of costly error and of gross danger, that I recommended that the Arms Control Subcommittee take the issue to the people in public hearings. The result of that national debate was an unprecedented public involvement in a technical issue. President Nixon won his go-ahead when the tie vote was broken by the Vice President, Mr. AGNEW. After so vigorous a battle and so close a vote, one would have thought the administration would hardly dare only a few months later to ask for a considerably expanded ABM system, yet it did. The administration itself thus seemed to be validating the charge that its earlier request for only two sites was in fact a planned foot-in-the-door maneuver.

There were a year ago, and there still are, other sharply critical technical questions which have never been answered satisfactorily by the Defense Department. For example, the "Safeguard" ABM system depends upon a single, very expensive—\$200 million—radar for each Minuteman complex, with a small number—the number is still classified—of Sprint missiles to protect the siloes, and an even smaller number to protect the radar.

But failure of the radar or its destruction would mean collapse of the whole operation. This problem was compounded by the fact that the Soviet Union's more cheaply developed and numerous SS-11 missiles, while not of sufficient explosive power and accuracy to endanger our siloes, are of sufficient power to destroy the radar installations. The missile-site radar, then, was much "softer" and thus easier to destroy than the siloes it was supposed to protect. This was the weak point of the whole concept of the ABM, a weakness obviated by the more traditional strategy of "diversity of deterrents" whereby the missiles would be widely dispersed and therefore a sufficient number would remain operational and could retaliate for any conceivable enemy attack.

The final argument, which the administration has also thus far failed to counter is based on the fact that the "Safeguard" system, in order to be reliable, must be in a constant state of readiness, and therefore dependent on the most highly sophisticated computer systems. Such refinement of computer technology, which was gravely doubted a year ago, is even more dubious now. And since we have had no experience with actual deployment upon which to base any further expansion, I cannot see that the administration has proved or even strengthened its case.

Moreover, evidence indicates that if the threat of the Soviet SS-9—a much more powerful weapon than the SS-11—

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against the Minuteman silos greatly increases, then the ability of Safeguard thick or thin, to protect the missiles from nuclear assault would be entirely canceled out. Thus, dispersion and/or mobility remains the only effective deterrent strategy. And if it could be proved that the Soviets were targeting SS-9 missiles against all of our Minuteman silos, some other tactic, perhaps mobile Minuteman or more submarine missiles, would necessarily have to be considered.

It is true that some technical witnesses had testified that an effective defense of the silos against SS-9 attack could be made by employing many small radar systems rather than one large one; which, of course, would obviously render the entire defensive operation less susceptible to failure. Nor would a system of this kind have to play the dual role of hard-point defense—that is, defense of our offensive deterrent weapons—and population defense at the same time, and therefore would not be a threat to the Soviet deterrent—a perfectly legitimate argument that President Nixon stressed when choosing the Safeguard system over former President Johnson's Sentinel.

Nevertheless, should the Soviet deployment of SS-9 missiles create an imbalance in the deterrent ratio—which cannot now be ruled out unless controls are agreed upon at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—SALT Conference—then, as I have said, something other than ABM deployment would appear far more effective, far less risky, and perhaps even necessary. I suggest that mobile offensive power would have a greater deterrent effect upon both Russia and China than an untested antiballistic missile defensive system. And it goes without saying that the American people are surely more concerned about Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines than they are about her own anti-ballistic-missile sites around Moscow. And presumably the same is true of the Russian people and their leaders.

I had the impression throughout the hearings that Secretary Melvin Laird's arguments indicated he believed the way to stop an arms race is to win it. Indeed, I suspected that the real motivation may have been to gain a bargaining position against the Soviets, which is precisely the reason President Johnson, according to former Vice President Humphrey, advocated the Sentinel ABM system.

I pointed out to the Secretary that with the multiple warheads being developed for our missiles, the United States would soon have 6,500 thermonuclear weapons constantly on the alert and on the move in our submarine fleet, in addition to 3,000 landbased missiles. In addition, we have 1,000 nuclear warheads ready to be delivered by bombers, as well as 7,000 "tactical" nuclear weapons in Europe. No conceivable number of Soviet antiballistic missile systems could constitute a real shield against all these nuclear weapons. The ultimate absurdity of the administration proposal is obvious to anyone who has not entirely abandoned simple mathematics and logic: no attack from any foreign country or combination of countries could in the foreseeable

future neutralize a nuclear force of this strength and diversity.

The most disturbing aspect of this almost irrational advocacy of ABM is its possible effect on the larger issues of our foreign policy, and this not merely in terms of the dangers of any nuclear escalation, but even more so with regard to the premises on which our entire strategic posture is based. It is my belief that President Nixon raised very serious questions about our basic postulate of retaliatory deterrence by his statement on January 31, 1970, that the Safeguard system should be expanded in order to provide a "credible foreign policy in the Pacific area." He went on to add that such an area defense would be "virtually infallible"—the latter phrase one can charitably interpret as merely another instance of ad lib hyperbole, as I have since heard no one either in the administration or out of it uphold, or even attempt to uphold it.

The notion of making our Asiatic foreign policy credible by nuclear weapons is entirely different from—and, indeed, more shocking than—the mere advocacy of a limited ABM system. If the new Nixon doctrine for Asia means that the United States will not commit substantial ground troops in Southeast Asia in the future, the President would seem to be proposing that undesirable moves by Communist forces in that area will be met by the threat of nuclear attack. He thus seems to have abandoned our deterrent strategy and embraced that of massive retaliation. How true it is that the more Republican administrations change, the more they remain the same. Furthermore, one wonders how such a threat could be made credible in order to discourage a possible Chinese attack against her neighbors, if we cannot even rely—as Safeguard proponents affirm—upon our destructive nuclear arsenal to deter a Chinese attack upon the United States, even when China has only a few such weapons.

We have been hearing about the Chinese nuclear threat for several years now. It has become the new club which the military-industrial complex flauntingly wields to win greater and greater appropriations from the Congress. But I question whether the execution of the threat is in any way imminent, and I incline to believe that we do have a considerable time factor in our favor. It still seems to me that it would be suicidal for the Chinese to unloose a few nuclear weapons upon the United States and thus invite retaliatory destruction. This is completely contrary to the common-sense foundation of the theory of deterrence, unless, of course, one accepts the old racist canard that the Chinese—with their teeming population, anti-hill existence, et cetera—place no value whatever on human life.

A little more than a year ago when the Senate was considering the initial authorization for deployment of the Safeguard ABM system, I described Safeguard as a weapons system in search of a mission which it surely had not found. The search, Mr. President, continues. The mission has not been found.

The ABM system was first supposed to protect the population of this country against a presumptive Chinese missile threat, even though the Chinese still have not yet tested an ICBM. Then it was supposed to protect some of our missiles against a Soviet attack. Then it was supposed to protect our population against a presumptive Chinese attack or an accidental launch, and our missiles against a Soviet attack, providing that the attack is not too large for the Safeguard system to handle, and to give us a "bargaining chip" in the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. If these talks succeed, and produce an agreement limiting ABM systems and offensive missiles, then the work that has been done on deploying the system will have to be stopped, at a nonrecoverable cost of just under \$3 billion, to cite the figure used by Secretary Laird before the Armed Services Committee. If the talks fail, and no limitation on offensive and defensive weapons results, the system will have to be replaced because it will not be able to handle the threat that will confront this country, according to most of the best informed and most experienced scientists in this country. In other words, if we do not need it, it is useless. On the other hand, if we need such a defense, then it is hopelessly and totally inadequate.

Many of these eminent scientists have appeared before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization which I have the honor to chair. Beginning in early February and continuing until late June, the subcommittee conducted an extensive set of hearings on "ABM, MIRV, SALT and the Nuclear Arms Race." Among the scientists who appeared before the subcommittee were three of the four former Presidential Science Advisers—Dr. Donald F. Hornig, president of Brown University; Dr. George Kistiakowsky, of Harvard University; Dr. Jerome Weisner, provost of MIT, a former director of Defense Research and Engineering; Dr. Herbert York, director and deputy director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center; Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky; Dr. Sidney Drell; and Prof. Marvin Goldberger of Princeton University, a member until recently of the President's Science Advisory Committee. In addition, testifying before the committee on the broader implications of the Safeguard question were two experts on China, A. Doak Barnett of the Brookings Institution, and Mrs. Alice Langley Hsieh of the Institute for Defense Analyses; the former Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dean Adrian Fisher; a former Assistance Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency who is an expert on verification, Dr. Herbert Scoville of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; a former assistant to President Kennedy and to President Johnson for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, now president of the Ford Foundation; and the director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, Dr.

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Marshall Shulman. In addition, the subcommittee met in executive session and received classified briefings on Soviet and Chinese strategic capabilities from Richard Helms, the Director of CIA, and on the SALT talks by Gerard Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Defense Department's case for the Safeguard system was presented in public sessions of the committee by Secretary of Defense Laird and Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

With the understandable exception of Secretary Laird and Dr. Foster, the witnesses who appeared unanimously opposed any expansion of the Safeguard system. Those with a scientific background pointed out the technical deficiencies of the system. These were, to sum up, that the Safeguard defense of Minuteman depends on a \$200 million MSR radar for each Minuteman complex and on a small number of Sprint missiles to protect the Minuteman silos and the radar. Since the radar is "softer," meaning more vulnerable to attack, than the missile silo it defends, an attack on the radar would be an attractive enemy tactic. Soviet SS-11 missiles have sufficient accuracy and power to destroy the radar, although they do not at present have the capability of endangering the Minuteman silos. Thus, the Soviets could use the large number of SS-11 missiles in their arsenal to destroy the MSR, leaving the larger SS-9's free to attack the Minuteman. In addition, it was pointed out by many witnesses that the performance of the PAR radar could be impaired by the proximity of nuclear explosions. The conclusion of all of these scientists was that the Safeguard system could not defend Minuteman. One phrase, formulated almost identically, appeared in their testimony. To use the formulation employed by Dr. Hornig:

During the last year, it has become clear beyond reasonable doubt that if the defense of Minuteman were the only, or even the principal, function of Safeguard, its deployment could not be justified.

This conclusion was underlined graphically by a chart prepared by Dr. Panofsky which appears on page 430 of the subcommittee hearings. The chart shows that if the deployment of SS-9's levels off or is limited by a SALT agreement, then the danger level of potentially lethal attacks against Minuteman silos—defined as the number of warheads capable of knocking out 700 Minuteman silos—would never be reached. On the other hand, if the Soviets decide to put a large effort into deploying MIRV's on their SS-9's, if they continue or increase the deployment rate of SS-9's or if they improve the accuracy of their SS-11 missiles, which recent tests suggest they may well be doing, then the danger level could be reached before the middle of this decade, which means before the Safeguard system could be deployed. Thus, for Safeguard to have any significant effectiveness at all, the Soviets would have literally to tailor their threat to the deployment schedule and capabilities of the system—our system,

that is. Could the Soviets be relied upon for such accommodation? Thus, once again, it is revealed that if Safeguard is needed, it is inadequate. If it is not needed, it is expensive and superfluous.

Dr. Drell put the case succinctly when he told the subcommittee:

There have been extensive studies, and I believe it is fair to say that all now recognize that Safeguard, even working perfectly, and with a full nationwide Phase II deployment costing about \$10 billion can be effective in preserving 300 Minuteman missiles, which is deemed adequate as a retaliatory force, against only a very narrow band of models of an assumed Soviet strike. Against lesser threats it is not needed and against greater threats it is ineffective.

It is interesting to note that when I suggested last year that a primary motivation for ABM deployment was an "arm to parley" notion the denial was quick and vehement. This now seems to be avowed. Once again, as is the case in instance after instance, what we, the critics of ABM, said of it a year ago is now acknowledged by the Defense Department, either explicitly or implicitly.

The effectiveness of the system seems to me to be one significant argument against its value as a bargaining chip, even if such a strategy were viable. A second argument against the claim that Safeguard is a valuable bargaining chip is a direct result of the action taken by the Armed Services Committee in limiting the Safeguard system to the defense of Minuteman and in deciding that "there is no compelling need to move now to the deployment of an area defense of our population against Chinese Communist ICBM attack." This statement of the Committee on Armed Services is directly contrary to the position of the Defense Department.

If the Soviets fear our ABM deployment, which I question, it is likely to be their concern that it could be developed into a thick area, or population, defense system which would increase the invulnerability of the United States to a second strike and thus, it might be argued, put us in the position of being able to launch a first strike without fear of retaliation. Soviet fear of Safeguard could not be logically based on concern that the system will provide effective protection of Minuteman missiles and leave the United States free to launch a retaliatory second strike. But the Armed Services Committee has knocked out the population defense potential of the Safeguard system—which President Nixon advocates—and left only the theoretical possibility of Minuteman defense—which almost all competent scientists deny. Thus it is the Armed Services Committee that has already taken away the bargaining chip—if, indeed, ABM could ever have been regarded as a bargaining chip. Safeguard, limited to the defense of Minuteman, is hardly a weapon calculated to give us bargaining leverage. As the distinguished junior Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson) told the Senate on August 5:

The Committee has, to my mind, completely removed any reason for objecting to Safeguard on the grounds that the Soviets will find it 'provocative' . . . The Soviets are

well aware that since Safeguard offers only incidental protection—

I read this, Mr. President, again, to emphasize that this is the distinguished junior Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson), the champion of ABM deployment, whom I am quoting. Let me read that sentence again:

The Soviets are well aware that since Safeguard offers only incidental protection to the tiny fraction of our population living on or near one of the Air Force bases where Safeguard will be installed, the Soviet assured destruction capability will in no way be imperiled.

Mr. Adrian Fisher, former Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated:

I am aware of the argument . . . that it is necessary to go ahead with authorizing the proposed Modified Phase II Safeguard item in order to strengthen our bargaining position in Geneva. I don't believe that is persuasive.

I digress to recall to the Senate again that when, a year ago, I suggested that this was one of the real motivations of ABM deployment, it was vehemently denied.

To continue with the statement of Dean Fisher:

As a practical matter, authorizing armaments so that they can be included in a disarmament program soon reaches the point of diminishing returns and that point may well have been reached, passed, well-passed, with the approval of Phase I. If both sides were to play this game of proceeding with further weapons systems to strengthen their hands in negotiations you would have a gigantic buildup, just so you would have something in the SALT talks and far from being a help to peace they would be a greater threat to the world. It would be an excuse for both sides to build up now, each saying, "I hate to do it but I have to do it so I have something to bargain with in Vienna." (Page 247, Gore Subcommittee hearings.)

There is, of course, another argument for not proceeding with any further deployment of the Safeguard system that has nothing to do with bargaining chips, and that is the wisdom of being reasonably sure that an expensive weapon system works in the first place before it is expanded, at great cost and great risk. Testifying before my subcommittee last year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard said that the plan that was being recommended at that time—

Was developed, in part, so that we can get a complete system together at the earliest possible date and shake it down. Then we will be in a position so that if the President decides that additional deployment is necessary, it will be possible to proceed with that deployment earlier than if we had waited to test the whole system.

He subsequently said at the same hearing:

We are proposing that we proceed with Phase I, that is, deployment around two Minuteman wings, and providing funds to acquire the land for the remaining sites. This initial move gives limited protection to all our Minuteman. It gives us the opportunity to get these two systems put together, shake out the bugs and put them underway.

Dr. Packard also showed the subcommittee a chart, reproduced on page 293 of last year's hearings on "Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM

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Systems," which stated that Phase I of Safeguard, involving missile sites at two Minuteman wings, had two purposes. The first was that Phase I "gives limited MM protection," meaning Minuteman protection. But the second was, and I am quoting the words which appear on the chart, "provides operational experience."

What has been the "operational experience" to date? The answer is none. In the words of a Defense Department statement, "No Safeguard components are installed and operated now at Phase I sites." In fact, the contracts for construction were let only this spring.

Where then, Mr. President, is the experience, is the shakedown, is the testing, which Congress was promised would be undertaken before further deployment or expansion? They do not exist.

Dr. Panofsky dealt with the question of experience to date in his testimony before the subcommittee in the following statement which appears on page 178 of the subcommittee hearings:

Where, then, is the new experience on which the decision to expand ABM deployment now was to be based? There also have been no production of radars or missiles; the contract to develop the first site for future technical use was awarded by the Army just 2 weeks ago. The date at which equipment can be received at the sites has slipped by almost 1 year. None of the technical results in the ongoing development work have made Safeguard look better. On the contrary, several factors exist which tend to degrade the expected performance of Safeguard: The ability of the PAR, perimeter acquisition radar, to function in the presence of nuclear explosions is highly dubious, and the computer severely limits the performance of the system in handling large attacks; also, costs have risen substantially. Dr. Dreil told the Subcommittee:

One major argument for last year's deployment decision as stated by Secretary Packard in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on April 6, 1969, was that this is a very complex system and actual operational sites are needed to put together the complex computer and radar components into an actual operating system. Today I am here to oppose strongly the proposed expansion not only because of the known technical inadequacies but because, in fact, we have yet to gain any of the experience motivating the Phase I decision that was promised as part of a phased deployment program. At this time no equipment is in place, no parts of the system are complete, and its operating capability is still under study. What then have we learned to support the expanded deployment?

Mr. President, the inescapable conclusion of the subcommittee's 2-year examination of the Safeguard system is that the workability of Safeguard as designed is extremely doubtful and that even if it were to do so it would not protect us against the threat that we will face in the future if the SALT talks do not succeed. As for the "bargaining chip" argument, the Armed Services Committee's action in clearly restricting Safeguard to Minuteman defense deprived that argument of any force, if it ever had any. It has also deprived the Safeguard system of any justification for its existence, let alone its expansion. Dr. Dreil told the subcommittee:

All analyses of which I am aware make it clear that if defense of Minuteman is the

principal or sole mission of Safeguard, its further deployment cannot be justified.

The O'Neill report, drawn up by an ad hoc group of scientists organized by the Department of Defense, reached exactly the same conclusion.

If the only purpose of Safeguard is defined to be to protect Minuteman, Phase II-A as defined in March 1969 should not proceed, the report said.

The search for a mission for Safeguard thus goes on. The mission has obviously not yet been found.

Aside from all the sophisticated technicalities, Mr. President, I ask whether our people are concerned about questionable deployment of Soviet ABM missiles around Moscow that have no capacity to hit the United States and which we could quickly exhaust with our massive offensive capability, or are we concerned with Russian ICBM and submarine capability to hit devastating blows on the United States? If we are primarily concerned about the possibility of an attack on our country, as I believe, then is it not reasonable to conclude that the Soviets have similar concern? I pose these questions, Mr. President, to illustrate once again my belief that reliance upon an anti-missile missile defensive strategy is a maginot line concept. In my view, the best defense is a powerful offensive capability with an unquestioned will to use it in case of a nuclear attack upon the United States—that is, with the potential enemy having no doubt that the United States has the will to use its retaliatory capacity. This is our real deterrence.

So, the ABM defense, instead of being "virtually infallible," turns out to be fallibly virtual—that is, in theory illogical, and in practice ineffective. For myself, unless our security requires it—and ABM is surely not required—I see no reason for feeding the flames of international hostility by the continued piling of weapons system on top of weapons system. And at such a cost!

Domestic needs, which have been unmet for years, cry out for solution. Unfortunately, to President Nixon \$1 spent on educating our children or on needed social security benefits is highly inflationary, while \$10 spent for useless and potentially dangerous weapons is, somehow, not inflationary. This I totally reject.

But the most serious implication of any ABM development is its possibly adverse effect upon the prospects for successful conclusion of an agreement at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or at whatever subsequent arms-control negotiations may ensue. The implications will be equally grave whether ultimately a thick or thin ABM system is created. For the level of ABM defenses which may be successfully negotiated at the SALT, or other similar such conferences, might well determine the limitations on offensive and defensive strategic weapons that are subject to mutual agreement. The more uncertainty aroused by the ABM deployment, the greater will be the insistence both in the United States and in the Soviet Union for "damage limiting" defensive

deployment. And the more defensive deployment, the more offensive deployment will be necessary to retain either "balance" or "superiority" or "sufficiency" in nuclear arms.

Now is the time to call a halt to this seemingly endless escalation. More than a year ago former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford observed:

The hard fact is that we may never again expect to be in as favorable a position as we now enjoy for entry into talks about a freeze in strategic nuclear armaments. Technological developments may well make any arms limitation agreement more difficult to develop and enforce a year from now, or six months from now, than it is today.

That "today" has long since passed.

Of course, there are still some people, I am sorry to say, both in and out of Government, who feel that "it is impossible to do business with the Russians" on any basis. And they are so distrustful of our ability to protect our own interests in negotiations that they feel it best not even to enter into preliminary discussions. This is both ridiculous and dangerous—for us and for the rest of the world. As William C. Foster, former Chairman of our Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, wrote in Foreign Affairs—April 1969:

Many people have the impression that dealing with the Soviets is like dealing with creatures from another planet. That has not been the experience of this observer. On the whole they have shown much the same personal reactions as Westerners. Moreover, they respect candor about basic conditions which cannot be waived in a negotiation—just as they respect those who keep their confidences.

This in general reflects my own experience with Soviet negotiators—with whom I have had a good deal of contact both at the U.N. and as Senate delegate-adviser to various Geneva conferences on nuclear weapons—and leads to my belief that the political leaders of this country would do well not to abet and exploit the popular American apprehensions about being "unable to do business with the Russians."

I call upon President Nixon for enlightened leadership such as he spoke of in his good speech in Rumania last year.

There is apprehension and distrust on both sides of what is becoming an ever thinner, though still existent, iron curtain. Because of this mutual distrust, both nations have habitually kept ready or in development almost every new weapon its strategists, whether military or civilian, want to test and deploy. There can never be a "sufficiency" to use President Nixon's expression, for these strategists—not from here to doomsday, which quite simply is where we have been heading.

Any agreement with the Soviets—on arms limitations or on anything else—should be one that is capable of verification. I have insisted upon this. This was a major reason for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, as I insisted at the time, should not include underground tests. Neither side was sure that a violation by the other would go undetected. But we can detect an atmospheric test, or one under water, or in space.

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Any agreement with the Soviets must serve and protect our national interests; similarly, we cannot expect them to agree to anything that fails to safeguard what they regard as their vital concerns. But there are areas in which there is a mutuality of interest. Surely both we and they share an interest in halting dangerous and costly escalation of the nuclear arms race, under conditions by which neither side would gain an advantage. In fact, never in history have there been two nations with a greater mutuality of interest, in that never have two great nations had as much to lose from all-out war, or from a continued drain on those national resources that might well be applied to constructive purposes.

Agreement can come only when there is relative parity. We have a sort of parity now in the sense that each side can destroy the other several times over. Those who believe that ABM, or the next round, or the next, will place us in such a strong position that we could, and would, be able to engage in nuclear blackmail to compel submission of our adversaries, misread the history of the nuclear arms race and of human nature as well.

A brief chronicle of our race to the top of the nuclear volcano will support my sharply critical judgment above. In 1961 the Soviets had but a small number of ICBM's, but the United States, not believing that a small number would "satisfy the Russians" and feeling that we might be overtaken, undertook a gigantic expansion of the Minuteman and Polaris forces. We ended up with many more weapons than were needed to destroy Russia several times over. Then the Soviets responded to our increased efforts by intensifying their own ICBM program and building their own nuclear submarine fleet. The age of overkill was upon us. Both psychologically and factually, this is a terrifying situation since either side may regard or delude itself as being in a position to launch a successful "first strike."

The Soviets now seem to be developing a "fractional orbital bombardment system" which theoretically would be almost impossible to detect and destroy, since the assault weapons may come in at a low level, at a relatively flat angle. Conceivably, such a system would threaten our bomber fleet on the ground. Thus, again, a "first-strike" capability could be said to be in the process of development. And, of course, we will react in kind. Of course, but why always "of course"? There are no absolutes, as far as I know, in military technology. Is it not time that this game of technological leapfrog was brought to an end? It adds nothing to the security of anyone elsewhere in the world, and it destroys the possibility of "domestic tranquility" at home by reason of its astronomical costs.

The domestic needs of our society and the peace of the whole world are too great for any nation to squander its riches on destructive weapons or on futile efforts to protect against such weapons. The only true protection against nuclear exchange is the prevention of

that exchange. Once it has started, both sides have lost: all will have been lost.

The search for some formula to bring nuclear weapons under control has been an urgent task of four administrations, beginning with President Eisenhower. Despite a commendable start by President Nixon, the task remains. Whether it will be successfully prosecuted by the present administration is still uncertain.

Still one must have faith in the future, faith not in patrician groups or elites—a given government, the military, the scientific community, and so forth—but in the people. President Nixon won the first round with his ABM proposal. He will lose the second, I believe, on Wednesday.

The American people are too aware of their humanity, of their needs which are common to all peoples. The sentiment for a reordering of priorities runs very deep in the people of this Nation, and in the people of Tennessee. And so, too, does commonsense, that commonsense which no longer blindly trusts the words of the experts, of the professional planners, of the "new mandarins," who have led us into this valley of the shadow.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I would like to begin by complimenting the distinguished Senator from Tennessee. Although I was not in the Chamber to hear the entirety of his speech, the great portion I did hear certainly indicated a very thorough and precise look into the problem of the ABM. As usual, the distinguished Senator from Tennessee presented before this body a remarkable context of all the reasonable arguments of why this is another gigantic mistake we would make if we were to approve this system as requested.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I am grateful for the very generous remarks of the able Senator from Iowa. I have spent a great deal of time on the question of ABM deployment. The subcommittee of which I am chairman has conducted extensive hearings, both public and executive. I am confident that the conclusions I stated are shared by a majority of the members of the subcommittee. It, indeed, would be a grave error further to expand the ABM system.

THE SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, once again we are debating approval of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system. Once again we are being told of an increased threat from the Soviet Union.

But however familiar the arguments may seem, conditions have changed. Our debate this year takes place in a differ-

ent context. The events of the past 12 months have strengthened my conviction that Safeguard would be a tragic waste of resources.

In short, the changes that have occurred are in the direction of reinforcing the very substantial case against Safeguard.

What has changed in the past year? Supporters of Safeguard argue that the Russians have continued their construction and deployment of offensive missiles. If this is true, it would only be in line with my prediction of last year. At that time I said: "Inevitably, if we deploy a new weapon system, the Soviets will take measures to catch up." Soviet military planners have the same distrust of us as our planners do of them. This is why there are arms races: each side wants to get ahead of the other.

We now have a chance to stop this spiral. I hope that we will take it.

Another change in the past year has been an increase in the projected costs of Safeguard. Last year we were told that the total cost of the system would be about \$10 billion. This year the estimates have risen over \$2.3 billion. If we examine the history of military cost increases, so ably exposed by the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), we can confidently predict that the costs of Safeguard will rise much further in the future. My good friend from Michigan, Senator HART, said last week that the ultimate cost might reach \$50 billion.

We should not be misled, since the costs seem relatively small now, into thinking that another \$5 or \$10 billion will satisfy the every-increasing appetite for funds. This year's billion-dollar request is only the second installment on a costly house of cards.

When will it all end? Only when we vote to stop it.

Last year, many intelligent men—experts on the technical questions of radars, computers, and deterrence—told us that Safeguard was not likely to work in actual combat conditions. They testified that Safeguard was not cost-effective, because it could easily and cheaply be overwhelmed. They concluded that Safeguard was a wasteful and unreliable system.

I will not pretend that I have fully understood all these technical arguments. But I have been waiting for administration supporters to come up with reasonable answers to these sensible objections. So far they have not.

In fact, the administration now seems to be acting as if the deficiencies pointed out last year are fully recognized.

Last year, opponents of the ABM stressed the vulnerability of the missile site radars—MSR—and suggested that a better and cheaper defense could be built with a less complicated but specialized radar designed for Minuteman defense. Deputy Secretary Packard and Dr. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, both said that they had considered the use of smaller and cheaper radars, but had decided to try to get the MSR to do the job. This year they have gone ahead with active programs to develop such smaller and cheaper radars.

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Last year, the administration discounted proposals to develop a specialized ABM defense specifically designed to protect Minuteman missiles. This year, both the Air Force and Army are actively investigating such possibilities.

Although the Senate Armed Services Committee saw "no compelling need to move now to the deployment of an area defense," the bill before us does not impose that restriction on the Pentagon. In fact, administration witnesses never relented from their support of a full system of area defense. And the four sites sanctioned by this bill can still be the building blocks for such an area defense.

Our doubts about Safeguard are still unresolved. Whenever scientists raise technical objections, we are assured by the Pentagon that the bugs will be eliminated, given time and enough money.

Let me say in passing that it seems strange that Secretary Laird believes in a "fly before you buy" policy for other weapons systems, but not for the Safeguard. If ever we needed to avoid excessive costs and guarantee effective performance, it is in the ABM.

Another change since last year has occurred in the rationale for Safeguard. In recent months, we have heard three different justifications for the ABM from Administration officials. President Nixon continues to argue that the system is necessary to defend U.S. cities against a potential Chinese attack. Secretary Laird has dropped that argument—as has our Armed Services Committee—and now says that Safeguard is supposed to protect U.S. missile sites against Soviet attack. Since that objective has been seriously questioned, Dr. Kissinger now says that we need an ABM as a stimulus to an agreement with the Russians on arms limitation.

The administration no longer uses the Chinese threat, the possibility of accidentally launched ICBM's, or defense of U.S. bombers to support the need for the Safeguard system.

What are we really supposed to be buying with these billions of dollars? The administration has no clear and consistent rationale for this system. The rationale seems to be shifting according to what arguments the public seems likely to buy, rather than according to real defense needs. The ABM promises to cure more ills than the snake oil once sold by itinerant peddlers—and with about as much effectiveness, in my opinion.

There seem to be two major arguments left to be answered—the strategic argument, that Safeguard is necessary to defend the Minuteman; and the diplomatic, that Safeguard is needed to insure agreement in the SALT negotiations.

Safeguard must stand or fall on its effectiveness in the defense of the Minuteman. For that purpose, however, it is poorly designed, grossly extravagant, and of the most limited effectiveness.

The perimeter acquisition radars—PAR—which cost about \$150 million each, and the Spartan missiles, which cost at least \$3 million each, are almost totally irrelevant to Minuteman defense. The PAR's are not needed and could well

be ineffective because of the likelihood of a radar blackout produced by high altitude nuclear bursts. The Spartans would be ineffective against even the simplest kinds of penetration aids. The administration seems to admit the irrelevance of these two components, since it wants to add only Sprint missiles to the sites approved last year.

The missile site radars—MSR—is the heart—or, more accurately, the Achilles heel—of the Safeguard. But it is so expensive that only one is planned for each defense site. And the destruction of this radar would render the whole defense of its ICBM complex totally ineffective.

Such destruction would be a relatively easy task. The radar is so soft that there is no need for either high accuracy or large warheads in order to destroy it. Thus, the radars could be destroyed and the whole Safeguard defense negated without use of any of the SS-9 missiles about which we have heard so much recently. The SS-11 missiles, which the Soviet Union possesses in much larger numbers, would have a much more than adequate yield and accuracy to destroy the MSR's.

There is also a problem with the fourth major component of the Safeguard system—the Sprint interceptor missiles. Here the problem is simply inadequacy in numbers. While the administration has not seen fit to make public the number of these interceptors that are being procured, it is clear that they could be exhausted by a very modest attack. Moreover, because of their limited range, only a fraction of the Minutemen in each ICBM complex can be defended.

Although the Safeguard would not likely be totally useless in the defense of Minuteman, at best it would be useful only against a very narrow range of threats. Beyond a certain point which is far in the future, only a few months' production of more Soviet missiles would offset whatever effectiveness Safeguard could have.

This is not my judgment alone. In fact, it is the judgment of the Defense Department's own Ad Hoc Group on Safeguard. The distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) has added greatly to our understanding of these points by telling us about the O'Neill report from that group. That report said:

The group believes that a more cost-effective system for the active terminal defense of Minuteman than Phase IIA of Safeguard can be devised.

The report also said:

If the only purpose of Safeguard is defined to be to protect Minuteman, Phase IIA as defined in March 1969 should not proceed.

If the Soviet threat should develop as feared by Secretary Laird, there are preferable alternatives to Safeguard. Lt. Gen. A. W. Betts, Chief of Army Research and Development, admitted that earlier this year. He said:

When you get that kind of threat, then Safeguard is not the way to defend.

These preferable alternatives could include superhardening of the Minuteman sites so that they would be more resistant to the effects of nuclear blasts. Almost

certainly, a superhardening program would be less expensive than Safeguard, more effective, and attainable on a much shorter time scale than the Safeguard Deployment.

Another possibility would be to go ahead with the Navy's underwater long-range missile system—ULMS. While the Soviet Union obviously now has the technology to cope adequately with Safeguard, there is no evidence whatever that they have antisubmarine warfare capabilities to cope adequately with even our present submarine force, much less with the projected ULMS.

There is also the option of simply building more Minutemen or submarines, if the Vienna talks should fail and if we feel that our deterrent is becoming jeopardized. Secretary Laird has claimed that the Soviet Union can build new ICBM's in about 18 months. It is hard to see why it would take the United States much longer. We could thus build more missiles on a much shorter time scale than would be required for Safeguard deployment.

These alternatives would be necessary only if the SALT negotiations fail. But what we all want is for those talks to succeed. Thus we must answer the question: Will rejection of Safeguard destroy the possibility of a strategic arms limitation agreement?

I believe that the answer to that question is no. Our real leverage at Vienna comes from our overall strategic position and from our capacity to meet any increased threat, not with one questionable system, but with a whole array of alternatives. The Soviet Union and the United States did not sit down in Helsinki and Vienna simply to get agreement restricting ABM's, but to stabilize the number of warheads. Both nations recognize that it is in their interest to get some kind of agreement on this vital point in order to halt the arms race.

The bargaining card argument is as spurious as it is prevalent.

All along, the men in the Pentagon have said that we must judge our adversaries by their actions and capabilities, rather than by their intentions. But what if the men in the Kremlin accept the same principle? What would they see?

They would see that the United States now leads the Soviet Union in terms of deliverable warheads. We have an overkill capacity that would deter any rational man from attempting an attack on us. Even if all our Minuteman missiles were destroyed, we would still have our submarine-launched missiles and our strategic bombers to wreak unacceptable havoc on the Soviet Union.

Both nations are now moving to halt the arms race through the SALT negotiations. No one in this Chamber would want to do anything that would jeopardize those talks. But while we proceed with those vital negotiations, the administration is also proceeding with the development, testing, and deployment of the very weapons which the negotiations are intended to control.

Such a contradictory policy destroys our credibility at the bargaining table and jeopardizes the chances for success.

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We must not only say that we want mutual restrictions on armaments; we must also act as if we mean it.

How can we justify expanding our arsenal in order to reduce it? That kind of military logic is tragically similar to the tactic of destroying a village in Vietnam in order to save it.

Halting further construction or deployment of the Safeguard system will not endanger a SALT agreement. The Russians have reasons far more compelling than the American ABM for reaching some agreements on arms limitations. They—and we—can save billions and can free resources for domestic development if the arms race can be halted. Both nations have powerful incentives to reject notions of superiority in strategic weapons and accept instead sufficiency in deterrence.

If the Russians use our denial of ABM funds—except for research and development—they should know that the consequences will be expensive and dangerous. Both nations would feel compelled to continue the arms race and move into a new and costly generation of deadly weapons.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? I have to go to a committee meeting, and will not be able to hear the rest of his speech. But I was impressed with what the Senator from Iowa said regarding the workability of this matter. I hope he might even go farther.

What has impressed me, in some of the hearings and the executive sessions on this matter, even last year, was that in the discussions as to workability—on which I agree with the Senator from Iowa in his conclusions—another point was added, in that there were several of the witnesses who said, "Well, even if we make it work, assuming that everything were solved, we are not so sure that we would not, by that time, be defending something that is obsolete in itself."

That is what really bothers me about it.

Mr. HUGHES. That speculation has been brought up many times, as we both realize.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes. Which adds another factor to it. Even if we assume that we got everything moving and ready, and it all was there and working as intended, we still might be talking about the defense of an obsolete war weapon.

Mr. HUGHES. I wholeheartedly agree with the Senator from Washington.

Mr. President, the history of arms control efforts since World War II should have taught us that we can reach effective agreements with the Russians only through a policy of mutual restraint. We achieved the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty only by declaring a moratorium on testing and on the spread of weapons until the professed willingness of both sides could be formalized in a treaty.

We will obtain an arms limitation agreement only if we now show mutual understanding and restraint rather than mutual suspicion and impulsiveness.

Approval of the expansion of ABM—far from making agreement more likely—actually would jeopardize the nego-

tiations. At a time when we should be downshifting, we would be moving into high gear.

The distinguished Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) expressed a common argument of Safeguard supporters when he last last Friday:

Safeguard is our principal bargaining card.

That argument, in my opinion, is an expensive illusion. From all that has been said about the dubious reliability of Safeguard, I cannot see how anyone could believe that we have an ace up our sleeve. We know—and the Russians know—that the Safeguard is only a deuce. We would be bluffing only ourselves if we relied upon it to secure an agreement.

These are our answers to the major arguments against a halt in the expansion of Safeguard. I wish, in return, to pose some questions for the supporters of this expensive and dubious system to answer.

Why would the Russians abandon SALT if we stopped Safeguard? If they had strong reasons for entering into discussions, these reasons would not have been changed.

Is not the administration's policy fundamentally contradictory? Nations do not arm in order to disarm. Nor do they trust others who begin a new cycle in the arms race while saying they want to stabilize the balance of terror.

Finally, and perhaps most important, are there not better ways to spend this money? If our negotiations should fail, it seems undeniable that there are better ways to spend money on Minuteman defense. And in any event, there are far better and more productive ways to help our own people.

With the billion dollars in this bill this year, we could provide full-time preschool education for 500,000 children. Or we could provide nutritional supplements to needy pregnant women, nursing mothers, and small infants and still double the existing food assistance programs. Or we could build an additional 350 comprehensive neighborhood health care centers. Or we could assist rural development by providing community facilities, special housing, and family farm assistance.

We could do these things; we could do other things. We all have ideas for improving the quality of life in America, and for taking steps to restore a healthy environment so that we may continue to survive.

But we must also try to survive the threat of nuclear war. To do this, we must halt the arms race.

There is no deadline for action on ABM this year. We still have time to give peace a chance, to give negotiations a chance. Before we start down the path of phases II, III, IV, and so on, I hope that Senators will give earnest and careful consideration to the proposal to stop all deployment of the ABM. Last year was not soon enough. Next year will certainly be far too late.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the amendment that I now submit and intend to propose at the appropriate time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.

Boggs). The amendment will be received and printed, and will lie on the table; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the Record.

The amendment (No. 829) is as follows:

AMENDMENT No. 829

On page 2 of the amendment, beginning with line 8, strike out all down through and including line 20 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"TITLE IV.—PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF SAFEGUARD SYSTEM

"SEC. 401. None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this or any other act may be used for the purpose of deploying a safeguard system at any site."

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE) be added as a cosponsor of my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Boggs). Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENTS NOS. S31 AND S32

Mr. HUGHES subsequently said: Mr. President, I send to the desk two amendments intended to be proposed by me and ask that they be received and printed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dole). The amendments will be received and printed, and will lie on the table.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, this morning's Washington Post carried, among its letters to the editor, a most enlightened and rational statement about the true significance of ABM in the context of the SALT negotiations.

The conclusion of the five distinguished gentleman who signed the letter is that "a Senate vote against the ABM is a vote for success in SALT."

This is precisely the conclusion which I have tried to advance today, but since their argument is more eloquent and persuasive than mine could be, I ask unanimous consent that their letter be printed in the Record at this point.

"There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE ABM VOTE AND THE SALT TALKS

Recently administration spokesmen have been insisting that unless the Congress authorizes the continued construction and expansion of the Safeguard ABM, it will not be possible to negotiate an agreement with the Soviets at SALT to limit strategic armaments. They argue that the negotiators need the Safeguard bargaining chip to induce the Russians to halt the deployment of their large SS-9 ICBMs.

This would appear to be an attempt to exploit the desire of the Senate and the public to achieve success in SALT in order to rescue the Safeguard program from defeat. The administration has always defended the Safeguard ABM defense of Minuteman sites on the basis that it was not a threat to the U.S.S.R. If true, why then should the continuation of this program be a chip to induce the Soviets to agree to limit their offensive missile deployment?

The major U.S. threat to Soviet security lies in the deployment of the U.S. MIRV systems. On April 9, 1970, the Senate passed a resolution by a vote of 72 to 6 urging that the President propose to the U.S.S.R. an immediate suspension by both countries of further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems. Yet

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this MIRV chip has been thrown away by the accelerated deployment of the Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles with their MIRV warheads and by the reported proposal that any MIRV limitations must be accompanied by Soviet acceptance of extensive inspection of both offensive and defensive missile sites. There is no security justification for such urgent MIRV deployment since the heavy Soviet ABM which they were designed to penetrate could not be deployed and become operational for many, many years.

It has also been reported that the possible outcome of SALT would be an agreement that henceforth the United States and the U.S.S.R. will limit their ABMs to the defense of their capitals. The continued deployment of Safeguard at the Minuteman sites will not in any way contribute to the defense of Washington, and the Senate is being asked to endorse the expenditure of funds for useless hardware if SALT is successful and for an admittedly at best marginally effective system if it is unsuccessful. Why the U.S. should try to get the Soviets to agree to the deployment of ABM defenses for Washington and Moscow instead of a complete ABM ban is not clear, since the defense of Washington will not accomplish any of President Nixon's three objectives for an ABM system. A complete ban would eliminate the need for MIRVs and simplify the problems of verification by obviating any possible need for inspection. It is reported that the Soviets have indicated interest in such a complete ban.

Finally, history has unmistakably demonstrated that restraints, not accelerated weapons programs, pave the road to arms control. Overwhelming superiority did not induce the Soviets to accept the Baruch plan. On the other hand, President Kennedy's American University pledge to halt atmospheric nuclear testing as long as the Soviets did the same rapidly produced agreement to negotiate the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Similarly, the Senate passage without dissenting vote of the Pastore Resolution in 1966 endorsing efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons broke the ice toward starting serious U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty.

If the Senate wishes to conserve funds and make a maximum contribution toward improving U.S. security by achieving arms limitations and agreement at SALT, it will refuse authorization of funds for the expansion of Safeguard and forbid the expenditure of additional funds for the continued deployment at the two Safeguard sites approved last year until it is satisfied that the negotiators have not been able to persuade the Soviets to agree to limitations on offensive and defensive missile systems.

In our judgment, a Senate vote against the ABM is a vote for success in SALT.

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN.
KARL KATSEN.
ADRIAN S. FISHER.
FRANKLIN A. LONG.
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

Washington.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, another important contribution to the debate over the wisdom of proceeding with Safeguard is contained in the current issue of *The New Republic*. In that publication, Ralph E. Lapp cogently argues the case against ABM, declaring at one point in his article that:

"The Pentagon, having gotten the camel's head under the tent, is trying to ram through at least a hump."

Nothing has been completed in Montana or North Dakota.

Lapp writes:

Nothing works—but now the Defense Department summons forth Phase II to cram more short-range Sprint missile interceptors into the Montana-North Dakota sites, and seeks to establish a brand new Safeguard site to protect the Whiteman AFB in Missouri.

The aptness of the article is such that I would like to share it with my colleagues, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the *Record* at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

SALT CHIPS AND SAFEGUARD

(By Ralph E. Lapp)

The US Senate is now debating Phase II of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile program. Phase I of this ABM effort squeaked through the Senate last year by the narrowest of margins and, anticipating another close vote, the Senate Armed Services Committee has pared back the program hoping that a more modestly priced system will win support.

In reporting out the authorization bill, Senator John Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, claimed that the new version of Safeguard would cost only \$6.5 billion as opposed to \$10.7 billion for the full system. In making this cutback the Committee has once more shifted its stance on ABM, this time abandoning the 12-site area defense system (including protection against Red Chinese missiles) in favor of a 4-site deployment of radars and missiles. These will be aimed at defending part of the Minuteman ICBM force against the threat of a first strike by the Soviet Union. Senator Stennis maintains that the missile defense of Minuteman is absolutely essential to the survival of the United States—a thesis held with equal fervor by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird who has based his case for Safeguard on the first-strike potential of the mighty SS-9 Soviet missiles, as projected to the mid-1970s. But Sen. Stennis and Safeguard backers make no secret of the fact that their strongest argument is that the ABM system is a cardinal bargaining chip in the SALT talks, which seek to limit strategic arms. Defeat Safeguard, Sen. Stennis argued on the Senate floor, and "We would have a situation where Congress would deny to our President the very item—the major item, I believe—of the bargaining arrangement."

In response to the bargaining chip argument, Senator J. W. Fulbright highlighted the illogic of the concept: "They say that this money is to be only for hard-point defense for missile sites for Minuteman; and the very same day in a different context, you have Dr. Kissinger, the principal adviser to and spokesman for the President, saying, 'We are considering restricting ABM to the defense of Washington if the Russians only want it for the defense of Moscow.'" Ironically, the Washington ABM site is one abandoned in Phase II of the latest Safeguard plan. So it's difficult to see how a failure to fund Phase II this year has any chip-value at all. For that matter there is no ascribable value to either Phase I or Phase II since each now seeks only to defend Minuteman silos—and not to protect cities against atomic attack. The bargaining power of Phase II has to be related to the SS-9 and to further deployments of this offensive missile, but nothing coming out of the SALT talks at Vienna suggests such a deal.

Assuming, however, that the SALT agreement pointed to matching a Washington, D.C. ABM defense against the 64-Galosh missile system (ABM-1) deployed around Moscow, would this mean stopping work on the US sites planned to protect Minuteman? That's hardly a bargain that President Nixon could go for, especially since he has placed

so much emphasis on the Soviet strategic threat to these Minuteman bases.

Encouraged by the one-vote margin of loss in last year's Safeguard vote, opponents of the ABM program had been eager to press for denial of further funds to Phase I (\$1.0 billion) and new funds of \$0.4 billion for Phase II. The former funds one site to defend Minuteman missiles at the Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, and a second site at Grand Forks, AFB, North Dakota. Last year, in urging approval of funds for Phase I, Secretary Laird pleaded: "Let us deploy Phase I. Let us complete it. Let us finish it. Let us see how it works and after that decide whether to go ahead." This year the Pentagon, having gotten the camel's head under the tent, is trying to ram through at least a hump. Nothing has been completed in Montana or North Dakota; nothing works—but now the Defense Department summons forth Phase II to cram more short-range Sprint missile interceptors into the Montana-North Dakota sites, and seeks to establish a brand new Safeguard site to protect the Whiteman AFB in Missouri. This 3-site ABM system will cost \$5.9 billion, plus \$0.9 billion for nuclear warheads for a total of \$6.8 billion. There's even provision in Phase II authorization for preliminary work on another ABM site for the Warren AFB in Wyoming—the other hump of the camel!

On July 31, Senators Sherman Cooper (R. Ky.) and Philip A. Hart (D. Mich.) revealed their ABM opposition strategy, when they introduced an amendment to prohibit any new ABM sites from being constructed—beyond the two authorized in Phase I. Their amendment allows addition of more Sprints to the Montana-North Dakota sites, and is aimed at countering the don't-steal-the-President's-chips argument. That has become the mainstay of the Safeguard case, as illustrated by Senator Stennis' admonition on July 30th when he summed up a pro-ABM speech: "... I warn again, as strongly as I can, that a vote in the Senate against the ABM means sudden death at this sitting, at least, of the SALT talks in Vienna."

The history of the ABM project is tortuous, but never has a weapons system's justification shifted so abruptly to a basis of arms limitation.

It's tempting for a critic of Safeguard to analyze the new crop of inconsistencies, sudden swerves and policy twists in the program, but such an exercise merely underlines the irrationality of the whole program. Rather than attempt to follow the switchbacks and U-turns of Safeguard evolution, it is prudent to direct an analysis to the cost effectiveness of Safeguard, assuming the 3-site system is built and that it works.

The key question to ask about the Safeguard system is "How much does an ABM chip cost us—and how much will it cost the Soviets to match us?" Or, as Dr. John Foster, Jr., director of the Pentagon's research and development programs, put it: "—how much does it cost to add an extra defensive missile and how much to add an offensive missile?"

Dr. Foster gave his answer—\$3 to \$5 million for a US interceptor and \$10 million for a Soviet attacking warhead. His chip cost is two or three to one in our favor. But he is also chief salesman for the Safeguard and as such he may be swept up in his own promotional zeal. Therefore, we shall examine the Safeguard system and make an independent assay of the chip cost.

First, let's look at our costs. To do this, we need to examine the US ABM system in some detail.

Phase I of Safeguard consists of the following hardware items for the Malmstrom and Grand Forks bases:

One PAR (Perimeter Acquisition Radar) for long-range detection and tracking of hostile warheads.

One MSR (Missile Site Radar) for direct-

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ing missiles to intercept the detected incoming warheads.

One battery of long-range Spartan interceptors designed primarily for area defense of the United States.

Three batteries of short-range Sprint interceptors to back up the Spartans and to provide an active defense of the system radars.

The radars are the eyes of the Safeguard and they are also its Achilles' heel. Without electronic vision the giant missile system is blind and helpless to defend the Minuteman missile silos. Unlike the latter, which are underground silos built of reinforced concrete, the radars are ten times more vulnerable to a nuclear blast. As Defense Secretary Laird explained: "That is why most of our Sprint missiles will be deployed to provide protection for those MSRs."

In fact, Phase II of Safeguard adds four more Sprint batteries to the Montana and North Dakota sites to beef up the system. And in its initial version, Phase II sought to add ABM bases to protect the Whiteman (Missouri) and Warren (Wyoming) Minuteman fields. However, the Administration sensed the temper of the Senate and modified this deployment to include only the Whiteman site, reserving Warren for a future budget.

As it now stands, the Safeguard system will consist of 3 sites designed to protect 500 Minuteman missiles at a total cost of \$6.8 billion. This figure is out to be about \$13 million to protect each Minuteman, but the figure is too low because there are fewer than 500 Sprints and Spartans in the system available to defend the silos. The Sprints are limited to defense of only one Minuteman squadron (50 silos) at a time.

If the Soviets target their attack on the weakest link in the Safeguard chain, they would aim to destroy the radars. Therefore, the number of interceptor missiles capable of fending off such an attack is the critical figure to use in calculating the cost of an ABM defense chip. The Pentagon refuses to disclose the number of Sprints and Spartans being produced in Phase I and II, presumably to keep the Soviets in the dark. Disclosure of the number would strengthen the hand of Safeguard opponents who maintain that the system is too thin to provide a thick defense of a critical component like MSR. In any event, the Soviets will know the number soon enough when the Sprint-Spartan cells are constructed and made visible to orbital photographic inspection.

It will be assumed that the total number of killer missiles available for MSR defense is 100 per base or 300 for all three ABM installations.

Assuming that each killer interceptor knocks out one incoming warhead, we divide \$6.8 billion—the system cost—by 300 to obtain a chip cost of \$22 million for the defense. This figure is many times that given by Dr. Foster and is to be explained by the fact that he made only marginal allowance for radar costs and neglected the total systems cost. There is no military experience in the anti-missile field, although the use of surface launched missiles in attacking aircraft shows that it takes as many as 50 defensive missiles to knock out one aircraft. The one-for-one ratio that Dr. Foster assumes is a most optimistic forecast. Should it require two Sprints to kill off one warhead, then the chip cost escalates to \$45 million apiece.

Dr. Foster has minimized the U.S. chip cost; how valid is his \$10 million estimate for the matching Soviet chip? Estimating Soviet costs is a perilous accounting practice, but we shall proceed by using the very same figures that Dr. Foster cites for Soviet weapons. These are \$30 million for the monstrous SS-9 missile, which carries three 5-megaton warheads, and \$10 million for the SS-11 missile which mounts a 1-megaton warhead.

Megaton-class warheads are essential for silo-busting—for digging Minuteman out of the ground—but they are overkill weapons when targeted on vulnerable radars. A warhead of one-tenth megaton delivered two-thirds of a mile off-target would destroy an MSR. Therefore the Soviet have a variety of offense options in staging an attack on Minuteman if they wish to knock out the ABM system. They could allocate a small number of SS-9s to a radar-busting attack, equipping these missiles with many 0.1-megaton warheads. These need not all be MIRVed, i.e., independently targeted reentry vehicles; they could be partly clustered warheads like those carried in our A-3 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile. The US Poseidon missile, successor to Polaris, can mount a maximum of 14 warheads (MIRVs) per missile, so it is not unreasonable to assume that the much more massive SS-9 missile could carry twice as many warheads.

The Poseidonizing of the SS-9 was actually anticipated in the *Report on Military Spending* (to be discussed in a forthcoming article in *The New Republic*) released last month by Members of Congress for Peace through Law. This report put the cost of an SS-9 fitted with 20 warheads as \$35 million. Thus each attacking warhead would cost about \$2 million if allowance is made for launch failures.

A second Soviet option would be the employment of SS-11 missiles to carry, say, a cluster of five warheads. The Soviets have already deployed more than 830 of the SS-11s and allocation of a small fraction of these to radar-busting would make little impact on their inventory. They could also use the newer SS-13, a solid-fueled ICBM first deployed in 1968, to carry a multiple warhead. Such options would yield unit costs of about \$2 million per attacking warhead.

Such offensive options are by no means far-fetched; they are within easy reach of Soviet technology and must be considered as realistic threats to Safeguard. The Soviets could also employ decoys in an attack on MSR, but we shall restrict the analysis to live warheads as stipulated by Dr. Foster.

The above reckoning gives the Soviets a unit cost of \$2 million per warhead vis-a-vis \$22 million for a U.S. killer missile. That's an eleven-to-one cost advantage for the Soviet. My estimate and Dr. Foster's are widely divergent, differing by a factor of 22.

Senator Stuart Symington (D, Mo.), former Secretary of the Air Force, was much concerned with offense-defense cost ratios and subjected Dr. Foster to a barrage of barbed questions in the course of a Senate inquiry. Dr. Foster countered by saying: "The way to overcome your particular concern, Senator Symington, is to put in enough missiles for defense at half the price of the offense." But if the criterion used is correct, then there is something terribly wrong with the Pentagon's arithmetic.

The criterion used by Dr. Foster is backed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, for on page 21 of its authorization report we find: "The Committee accepts the view that the relevant criterion for the evaluation of a system of active defense is not the defense cost per Minuteman silo saved, or the relationship between the cost of the protection and the cost of the missile itself. It is, rather, a comparison of the cost of the defense to the cost of the offense to offset that defense." But the Committee provides no cost figures to support its case. Instead its chairman switches to a political base, namely, the President needs Safeguard as a bargaining chip at the SALT table.

Given the corkscrew course of the U.S. ABM program, one may wonder if the bargaining chip argument is bona fide. If it is then one may ask: How many bargaining chips do we need?

As will be shown in my critique of the MCPL (*Report on Military Spending*), the Administration is proceeding to acquire major strategic weapons systems—Minuteman III and Poseidon—whose chip value must impress the Soviets. Given the military worth of offensive missiles, the Soviets may be pardoned if they view Minuteman III and Poseidon as prime pieces on the strategic chess board and ABM as simply pawns.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUGHES. I am happy to yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. CRANSTON. I want first to thank the Senator from Iowa for the leadership he has provided on the ABM issue in offering this amendment. I believe that it is vitally important that the facts as he has stated them be considered and recognized by the Senate, and that we support this amendment as the soundest approach to the vast expenditure of funds that would seem to serve no constructive purpose, if ABM were continued as proposed in the pending measure. So I rise to support the Hughes amendment, of which I was the first cosponsor.

Mr. HUGHES. I wish to thank the distinguished Senator for the comments he has made regarding my approach to the amendment this year, for his continuing support, and for his concise look into the problems of this gigantic system in America which does not seem to be successful or to have the probability of success. I am grateful to the distinguished Senator for his comments of support today as in the past.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the statement has been made that nations do not arm in order to disarm. I am bound to say that I disagree with that. The entire history of conflict is to the contrary.

We armed belatedly in the First World War, only to disarm thereafter. We armed belatedly in the Second World War, only to disarm precipitately thereafter. In years almost too short to count, we armed hastily again for the Korean war, and we proceeded to cut down on forces and then armed again for the Vietnam war. The SALT talks are an effort to persuade the Russians and ourselves to disarm partially, to agree on a plateau of disarmament.

I never speak on any matters regarding the defense of the United States without wishing that I could support disarmament. The Russians for years have contended that we ought to have unilateral and complete disarmament, meaning that we disarm and they arm.

It would be far easier for me, especially in an election year, simply to say that I agree with all the proposals to disarm—let us turn the swords into plowshares and till the soil while other nations remain strong. I wish I could do that. It would make a very good argument for me in an election year.

I really wish I could support all the simplistic proposals to tie one hand behind our back and then try to move just as surely as possible into negotiation. But the evidence is indisputable to me that the one thing which has carried the SALT talks toward success has been the evidence which the Russians have seen on the part of the United States to

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maintain a minimal defensive posture. We are only talking about phase I of the ABM and not the so-called Chinese menace embodied in phase II.

I would hope that the SALT talks could come to an end so that we would know exactly what is expected of us, as Americans, with the deepest concern which every Member of this Chamber shares for the proper defense of the United States. But when we speak of expecting the restraint to be shown by other nations, it sounds like ancient history, to go back to 1922. That was the year, I believe, of the Treaty of Washington, and the great powers gathered and discussed naval disarmament. Then, practically everybody in America was for the most peaceful solution. Practically every Senator then, in those days, was for disarmament, and we did not have the close division of disagreement. We decided to trust everyone else. The arguments, I am sure, must have sounded as they have sounded in this year of 1970: What are we afraid of? What are we concerned about? If we disarm, they will disarm, too. They are only afraid of us.

We know what happened. We sank our battleships. We stopped the construction of other great ships on the ways. We had Colonel Mitchell go out with his flimsy plane and drop some bombs on the *Ostfriesland*, a captured German battleship, dropped some bombs on other vessels, and we sank them in the Chesapeake.

Everyone said, "The nations will not make war any more, and they will beat their swords into plowshares, and we will follow in the ways of peace." The Japanese did not destroy any vessels. They destroyed only the blueprints. The Imperial German Government did not destroy any vessels. It destroyed only the blueprints.

Now it is proposed not only that we destroy blueprints but also that we destroy our arms, that we cease to build, and that we do not defend the United States as our Defense Department says it must be defended.

I would rather have the other side of this argument. It is the popular side. It is the side on which people all say, "Never mind the defense of the United States. Nobody will hurt us."

We bought one big war and two little ones because we believed that argument before, and we will buy other wars if we believe it again. Just as surely as we stand here, we will be saying to those who are of an aggressive frame of mind, of a warlike nature, "The United States has done it again—in 1917 and 1940 and 1950 and 1961. So now we do it again, and we save money. We put it into things that we ought to put it in." I agree. We ought to put it into this and that and the other, and they all need it. But not one of them would be worth anything and not a domestic benefit would exist if this country lay prostrate at the feet of an alert and aggressive foe. No, I do not think we should go further than the Armed Services Committee has gone, but we ought to go at least that far.

We ought to remember the Naval Conference of 1922 and apply what happened after the Treaty of Washington to all the

arguments being made here. I do not know of any acid that would more successfully dissolve most of the arguments we are hearing than the recollection of the United States one more time deciding that it will deal not from strength but from weakness—from the sure strength that we believe in our principles, from the certain strength that we will defend ourselves, and from the complete determination that we will not make war upon anyone else, that we wish no nation's soil, and that we wish to give no offense to any peoples.

But, surely, there is a minimal line, and here we are in disagreement—honest, concerned Senators, all men of good will—as to where the line needs to be drawn. For me, I will draw it where the Armed Services Committee has drawn it. I will support the decision to continue only with the deployment of phase I. I will hope that the SALT agreements may make it possible for nations to forget this dreadful rollick of alphabets—the ABM, the ICBM, and the rest of the mutual horror with which we are confronting ourselves—and it can be done.

But it is, in my opinion, unlikely to be done if the Russian Government is convinced that the Congress of the United States is unwilling to defend the United States with adequate, needed, deterrent weaponry.

I wish I did not have to make this speech. I would far rather be making the others. If I could bring myself to believe it, I could make a better speech on the other side. But my trouble is, I cannot believe it. Being unable to believe it, I can only say what I have to say. I may add it is against the advice of most of the people in my own office that I am making this speech, and against the advice of the so-called public relations people I know, who say that I should listen to the letters and the protests, that I should listen to all those people who will help me get reelected.

I wish I could. But, there is a little matter of the oath of office. Each of us here separately is responding to his concept of that oath. So am I.

I will have to support the committee.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. SCOTT. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HUGHES. I should like to indicate to the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania that the junior Senator from Iowa very highly values his opinions in regard to this or any other problem our Nation may face. Certainly, in the common interest of all the people, his long experience and years of study and expertise in all these fields have brought him to a position of leadership in the Senate.

I respect him for the courage he has displayed in going against the advice of his public relations friends and most of the people in his office, but I should like to make a simple request of the Senator from Pennsylvania: that he read the speech I have just delivered on the floor of the Senate—I am sure he did not have the opportunity to hear it all—and if there is any indication in that speech that I advocated in any way the disarma-

ment of this Nation, or in any way to lessen the capacity of this Nation to respond to initiatives by other countries, or in any way to abandon the maintenance of adequate military capability of this Nation, under all circumstances, I hope that he would so indicate to me, because it certainly is not my intention to indicate anything like that.

The discussion and debate over the ABM system, on phase I, II, or III, I think, as the distinguished Senator indicated, has the potential result that honest men, with the common security of their nation as the reason for their statements, might arrive at different conclusions.

I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania for yielding to me.

Mr. SCOTT. I want to say to the distinguished Senator from Iowa that I shall read his speech and shall read it with a great deal of interest. I did read a part of it. As the distinguished Senator knows, I have not and certainly would not imply that there is lessening, or any less interest on the part of any Senator, or on the part of any other Senator, for the protection of this Nation. I had hoped to make clear my belief that a certain level of protection of our country is the minimal level I could support, that we do disagree, and that others have a view as to other levels which they believe to be adequate.

This is the high tradition of the Senate, that Senators disagree without being disagreeable about it, that we respect the conscience and concerns of each other, as I do the deep and the scholarly way in which the distinguished Senator from Iowa has approached the subject, quietly and reasonably. Therefore, it will be a pleasure, indeed, to become acquainted with the entire statement which the Senator has made.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield for a question?

Mr. SCOTT. I am happy to yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. MURPHY. I was impressed with the recitation of the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania about the experiences of the past, where the United States had taken the lead in giving concrete evidence that we are not a warlike nation, that we seek peace, that we destroyed our armaments while others tore up only their blueprints. I wonder whether I am correct in saying that the latest experience, I recall, had to do with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 3 or 4 years ago during the preparation of which, during all the advance talks leading up to the meetings, and during the meetings themselves, we found that the Soviet Union had, during all that time, been preparing for tests which gave them a great advantage in the nuclear field. Is that not quite right?

Mr. SCOTT. My recollection agrees with that of the distinguished Senator from California. That is how I so understand it.

Mr. MURPHY. The evidence is that during the entire time when we were taking the lead and once again saying, "Let us make every effort toward peace. Let us stop everything. Let us achieve

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peace. Let us achieve this hoped for, sought for, and prayed to objective where we can, gradually do away with armaments." But, during the time of those meetings and all those preparations, the high-yield tests by the Russians were actually on-going and must have been of No. 1 importance in order to have been achieved at the time they were going on. Is that not the Senator's recollection?

Mr. MURPHY. I thank my distinguished colleague.

Mr. SCOTT. My recollection is the same as that of the distinguished Senator from California.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I want to make this statement so that it will appear in the Record at this point, that the statement just made by the Senator from Pennsylvania is one of the best, particularly from the standpoint of leadership. It is also one of the best analyses, at the same time, of the situation with which we find ourselves confronted. I appreciate very much his strong stand here to meet what, unfortunately, is our first obligation in the Senate; namely, to protect the security of this Nation.

I know there are others who disagree with that who are equally as sincere as I am, but I think the Senator's statement is something to point to.

In this whole debate, the statement of the Senator from Pennsylvania is the stake to which the welfare of our country can be tied, and I commend him and at the same time thank him for expressing his fine sentiments.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I want first to say that I share with the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), my colleague from California (Mr. MURPHY), and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), the esteem they have expressed for the Senator from Pennsylvania, the distinguished Republican leader. He has set forth a viewpoint in regard to this legislation that merits the most careful consideration by the Senate and the country.

I know of no Senator in this body—and I am sure he knows of no Senator either—who advocates any form of unilateral disarmament by the United States. I believe that every Senator in this body knows that, and recognizes that the United States must have adequate strength to defend itself in a world of anarchy.

The Senator from Pennsylvania stated that it would be vastly dangerous if others in this world were given the impression that the Senate did not recognize the United States must have "adequate, needed, deterrent weaponry."

I would most certainly agree with that statement, but I do not see how that statement can relate to the discussion on the ABM system since I think the Department of Defense itself, in testimony rendered this year to the Armed Services Committee, indicated grave doubt as to the adequacy of the present proposed ABM system and its ability to do its performed task.

If that is true, it is certainly not needed. If that is true, it is not a deterrent. If that is true, it seems to me it cannot be classified as weaponry in the

sense that we would mean by weaponry, weapons that can really serve fully the defense of this country in a time of trial.

Mr. President, I rise in support of the Hughes amendment, of which I was the first cosponsor.

Last year, during the heated debate over the ABM system, a bumper strip appeared with the caption "The ABM Is an Edsel."

A year later I have concluded that this phrase was an insult to the Ford Motor Co.

The Edsel was designed to be an automobile, and it worked.

It is still unclear what the Safeguard system was designed to do.

Safeguard was conceived originally for one mission—the defense of our cities.

When it was found that Safeguard could not do this job, it was given another assignment—the defense of our Minuteman sites.

Now there is clear and compelling evidence that it will not be able to do this job either, and that there are less costly and more effective ways to handle the defense of our Minuteman.

The Safeguard system then is still, this year, as it was last year, a weapons system in search of a mission.

We have heard many arguments advanced in favor of ABM over the past years.

The defense of our cities, protection from the threat of a Chinese nuclear attack, the defense of our own landbased missiles, and so forth.

In fact, there never has been a major weapons system for which so many disingenuous and conflicting claims have been advanced.

The latest and perhaps the most ludicrous argument advanced in favor of the ABM is that we need it as a bargaining chip for the SALT negotiations in Vienna.

This argument would be genuinely funny if it were not for the tragic consequences which could flow from it.

Those who advance it believe that we can negotiate successfully with the Soviet Union only if we do so from a position of strength.

The fact is, however, that negotiation from a position of strength has never worked in nuclear negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Dr. Adrian Fisher points out, the Soviets rejected the Baruch plan in 1946 because they felt acceptance of the plan would make them a second-class power.

Similarly, we rejected Soviet overtures for a restriction of strategic nuclear delivery systems in 1957, because of our fears that they were ahead of us in delivery systems at that time.

In fact, arms limitation arguments have been successfully concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States only in those instances when both sides approached negotiations with an attitude of restraint.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will my distinguished colleague yield for a question?

Mr. CRANSTON. I am happy to yield to my distinguished colleague.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I would be most interested in knowing what

arms limitations conferences my distinguished colleague considers to be successful.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I am just going on to cite some that were successful. My analysis of them as being successful is based on my reading of current history and the remarks on the ABM debate by Dr. Adrian Fisher, who was the principal negotiator for the United States with the Soviet Union, some of which negotiations were successful.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, was he the chairman of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency?

Mr. CRANSTON. No. He was an adviser in the State Department.

Mr. MURPHY. He was connected with the Department of State and not with the Department of Defense?

Mr. CRANSTON. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. I thank my distinguished colleague.

Mr. CRANSTON. As an example of the times when we did not negotiate from a position of superstrength—and not from a position of weakness—but of restraint, I will cite the Antarctic Treaty, the Test Ban Treaty, and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

One of the most impressive pieces of evidence Dr. Fisher advances to support his contention that arms limitation negotiations are more successful when conducted in an atmosphere of restraint is the importance he attaches to the Pastore resolution in clearing the way for the nonproliferation treaty.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, would my distinguished colleague yield for a question?

Mr. CRANSTON. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, was my distinguished colleague in the Chamber when I referred to the Test Ban Treaty and pointed out that during the times of the talks and the meetings and all during the preparations for them, the tests which the Soviet Union conducted at that time and just before gave them a great advantage in the high yield atmospheric nuclear test? In other words, we had had a great advantage up to that point. But there is still some question as to whether they were successful negotiations from the standpoint of the United States of America.

I wonder if my distinguished colleague recalls that as to the nonproliferation treaty—and, from my standpoint, it was not a successful treaty nor from the standpoint of the United States—that all that treaty would do, once it was signed, would be to make the United States immediately involved if a nonnuclear nation was attacked by a nuclear power. We would have to go to the defense of the nonnuclear nation.

Then, as I recall, two nations—the French and the Chinese, both of whom had nuclear capability—said in essence they would not be a party to the treaty.

All the treaty actually did was to make it impossible for some of our potential allies in Europe ever to get nuclear capability.

There was some question in my mind

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as to whether that treaty was successful and whether it was to the advantage of the United States—if it was a treaty, in fact—and to the advantage of our allies in the free world.

I merely point that out because I know there has been so much discussion of these things and so much honest difference among those both for and against, that I wanted to make certain that as much of the history as I have been able to pick up is all made clear in the process of this debate so that with the good Lord's help, we might come up with the right answer. This is one area in which we dare not make a mistake.

I thank my distinguished colleague, Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague. I simply would say to him that the Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty were successful in that the basic objective was accomplished after substantial time had passed following negotiations and the Senate proceeded to ratify these treaties. Apparently the Senate by a vote of more than the two-thirds which is required felt that all in all, taking into account certain unhappy events that may have transpired during the negotiations, it was in our national interest to sign the treaties and have them in effect.

I know that my colleague is deeply concerned about pollution in this Nation. He has done a great deal of work in this regard. It was because of the elimination of nuclear tests in the atmosphere that create such a threat to mankind that we felt that treaty was necessary. Regardless of what may have happened during the time of the negotiations, it was felt that we should get it ratified.

In regard to the Nonproliferation Treaty, it was deemed to our advantage to have proliferation halted to the degree that it could be by those nations who were willing to sign the treaty. Not all of the nations have signed it. The greater the proliferation, the more danger there would be to mankind.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I completely agree with the thesis and the conclusions of my distinguished colleague.

My only point is that with respect to an approach to a hopeful and final solution of these armaments, so often we hear people say, "Well, if we will make the first move and set a good example, the others will follow."

Unfortunately, in my lifetime, I recall so often that we made the first move and other nations did not follow.

I am just wondering whether another approach might be more successful and more productive. For example, there was discussion in the debate here as to whether the first phase of the ABM would or would not help the SALT talks. Everyone in this Chamber wanted the SALT talks to take place and to be successful.

There is still a difference of opinion on the matter, depending upon which expert one listens to, as to whether the first phase of the ABM helped the SALT talks. I am under the impression that they did help the talks and that the talks proceeded to a greater and more successful

degree because of the ABM than they would have had we not voted for the ABM.

As my distinguished colleague knows, and perhaps better than I, this is an international poker game. I think the main target and desire of the United States is clearly stated; the object must be recognized for all who wish to recognize it. However, we often find on the other side suspicions with respect to whether it is real or whether it is for the purpose of facade. We always hear the same argument: "We will impress them that we want to be honest, decent, and fair and then they will react the same way." My concern is that that has not been so over the years. They are always testing and they will operate in their self-interest, as a nation.

At the moment I am concerned as a member of the Committee on Armed Services because of the conditions that exist in the Soviet Union and the ascendancy of the military group to the politburo, and the fact that they are building their military establishment not only at a fast rate but at a faster rate than our intelligence thought possible until 6 months ago. Also, at home we know that within the Soviet Union they have economic programs with very great and widespread problems, and with these conditions put together throughout history they have always resulted in serious trouble in the world.

So reading from the lessons of history and putting all of this together it is possible the Senator from California may be supersensitive in his desire with respect to the outcome of this agreement, but it is hoped that we will come up with the proper answer that will insure properly and safely the national security of the United States, for if that is destroyed I am afraid the main cause of peace throughout the world will be destroyed.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. CRANSTON. The senior Senator from California and the junior Senator from California are totally together in being determined to do whatever is necessary for the security of our Nation, the final point my colleague touched upon. Our only difference is that sometimes we have different theories as to how best to achieve that end.

On the matter of negotiations I will grant that the question of how the other side will react to a particular set of circumstances can never be known until you are at the bargaining table. But in looking at history, in five efforts at negotiations with the Soviet Union two were unsuccessful where one side was trying to negotiate from a position of overwhelming strength and three have been successfully negotiated without the other side seeking to get the best of the other.

Thus, in the case I was last discussing before entering into colloquy with my distinguished colleague from California, it was only after the Pastore resolution was adopted by the Senate that the way was clear for negotiations leading to the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Only when we made it clear that we had no intention of transferring our nuclear weapons to other powers did the

negotiations begin to move ahead in earnest.

I am convinced that the negotiation through strength approach is discredited both by experience and by commonsense.

I realize, however, that many of my colleagues disagree.

And I should like to leave one final thought with those who hold to a different view:

Does the deployment of a costly, non-cost effective ABM system which demonstrably cannot do the job it is supposed to do increase America's strength?

My conviction is that it does not, that it is just another costly and needless mistake.

The Russians, whatever else they may be, are not stupid.

They know, as well as we do, the limits of an ABM system.

After all, they stopped building one of their own.

This being the case, it seems to me that our own ABM is a pretty soggy chip to try to cash in at the SALT talks.

Mr. President, my firm belief is that there is neither safety nor security for any of us in a continuing arms race.

I believe responsible men in all nations are coming more and more to this view.

I realize, however, that pending the day when comprehensive arms reduction agreements are negotiated, we will have to continue to spend billions for our national defense.

But let us not bemuse ourselves into thinking that pouring billions into weapons systems which do not work will afford us any additional security.

Mr. President, we have already poured enough money down the drain on Safeguard. For the reasons I advanced and the reasons so eloquently and articulately advanced by the Senator from Iowa, let us not waste any more money now.

LETTER OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LAIRD ON
SAFEGUARD ABM

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I want to place in the Record today a letter to me from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird expressing the Secretary's view that diversion of the \$365 million in Safeguard research and development funds to a program of R. & D. on hard-site defense would "necessitate cancellation of the phase 1 deployment."

Senator STENNIS and I had expressed the same view on the floor of the Senate last Wednesday, August 5, in commenting on the Hart-Cooper amendment to the Defense Procurement Act, and on the explanations given by the sponsors in support of that amendment.

In his letter, Secretary Laird also points out that the development of a hard-site defense system is not envisaged as a replacement for Safeguard. The Secretary wrote:

Far from rendering Safeguard obsolete, hard-site components if deployed in combination with the Safeguard defense of Minuteman would provide a formidable counter to a severe threat, should it materialize.

Secretary Laird's letter confirms my view, expressed on the floor of the Senate last Wednesday. The Secretary states that in the event of a severe and rapid increase in the Soviet threat to Minuteman:

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We could strengthen the four-site Safeguard defense of Minuteman by deploying more Sprints and more MSRs in the same four Minuteman fields.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Secretary Laird's letter of August 7 be placed in the RECORD at this point:

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

Washington, D.C., August 7, 1970.

Hon. HENRY M. JACKSON,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SCOOP: I am writing in answer to your questions about the impact of amending the authorization bill to redirect \$365 million in Safeguard Fiscal 1971 RDT&E funds to development of a dedicated hard-site defense system.

Redirection of these funds would require that we stop deployment of Phase 1. Without funds for completing the relatively small amount of development work remaining and without funds for continuation of test and evaluation of system operation we could not field a completed system. This would, in turn, require that the contractors disband the skilled work force and specialized facilities assembled to produce Safeguard components.

The reason the impact is so severe is that redirection of the Safeguard RDT&E funds would preclude completion of Safeguard development and would bring to an immediate halt our test and evaluation program at Meck Island in the Kwajalein Atoll. There would be no further flight tests of the prototype system on Meck Island. I think you know that we have installed on Meck Island the essential elements of Minuteman defense—an MSR, its test data processor, initial software, Spartan launchers and Sprint launchers. We are now integrating this complex into a working system and have already passed the first milestone of a successful space point intercept with a Spartan missile under control of the Missile Site Radar and its data processor. It is absolutely essential that we complete this test and evaluation work, which gives us a very early look at the system performance. I am completely confident that the Meck Island tests will demonstrate continuing success; however, further confirmation by field testing is essential, and we want to get on with it. We must have the RDT&E funds that pay for operation of the Meck Island complex, for the Spartan and Sprint missiles flown in the test, special test targets, etc. Also, the RDT&E funds are needed to continue software development for the operational sites and to continue development of the Modified Spartan.

In the matter of developing a dedicated hard-site defense system, I fully support the development, and on numerous occasions Mr. Packard and I have so testified. We have tried to make clear the role hard-site defense plays vis-a-vis Safeguard defense of Minuteman. Safeguard is the earliest effective defense of Minuteman we can deploy. It will be effective against the likely threat of the middle 1970s, and for moderate threat levels Safeguard is economical.

It is important to understand two things: (1) dedicated hard-site defense cannot be available as early as Safeguard, and (2) hard-site is economical only if needed and deployed to counter very high threat levels. We do not expect these very high threat levels in the middle 1970s. Rather, we would expect them to develop later, if at all. But as a hedge against the possibility that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks fail to limit Soviet ICBM deployment and that our Safeguard deployment in defense of Minuteman

fails to discourage Soviet ICBM proliferation, we are developing a hard-site system that could augment Safeguard, if necessary.

Incidentally, I have read some recent press stories stating that hard-site is intended to replace Safeguard. This is incorrect. Far from rendering Safeguard obsolete, hard-site components if deployed in combination with the Safeguard defense of Minuteman would provide a formidable counter to a severe threat, should it materialize. Should the threat grow with extreme and unexpected rapidity so that it exceeds the Safeguard defense level before hard-site is available—something we do not predict at this time—we could strengthen the four-site Safeguard defense of Minuteman by deploying more Sprints and more MSRs in the same four Minuteman fields. We have no plan to do this, and we do not expect that it will be necessary; however, it is important to note that the option is available.

We are making good progress with the hard-site R&D program. It is now in the concept formulation stage, and we are defining a hard-site design which would be optimum for economical defense of Minuteman against very heavy threats. In addition we have funded some R&D work in technology areas which we are certain will be essential in developing hard-site system hardware and software.

We have not yet worked out detailed costs and schedules, but it appears that the development program will lead to a system which would become available, if needed, in the late 1970s, several years later than Safeguard. I have heard the comment of some who believe that we could make the hard-site system available sooner, even as soon as Safeguard. These comments overlook, for example, the fact that a full-scale prototype of the Safeguard Missile Site Radar has been under test on Meck Island for almost two years now while the hard-site system is today only a concept in the early stage of definition. Hard-site hardware has yet to be constructed for test and evaluation.

Also, redirection of the \$365 million of Safeguard RDT&E funds to support hard-site development is unnecessary. As we have testified, we have in the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense line item of our budget \$158 million in FY 71 R&D funds, of which \$58 million is set aside for development of a hard-site defense system. This amount was chosen to be wholly adequate for this phase of the program. Additional funding at this time would not expedite the hard-site program.

In summary, redirection of the Safeguard FY 71 RDT&E funds would necessitate cancellation of the Phase 1 deployment and all further deployment options. The diversion of these funds to the hard-site program would not expedite the development because it is fully funded for Fiscal 1971.

Sincerely,

MEL LAIRD.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I should like to conduct a colloquy with the Senator from Iowa concerning the time to vote on Wednesday, a matter that I think will be of interest to Senators.

Mr. President, the Senator from Iowa has an amendment which he has just explained. Referring to the unanimous-consent agreement, there is a special provision for 1 hour to each side on the Hughes-Brooke amendments.

The Senator from Iowa made a suggestion to see what would be the situation about coming to that amendment on Wednesday and getting it disposed of well ahead of the vote on the Cooper-Hart amendment.

Will the Senator state the proposal now?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, as the distinguished Senator has indicated, trying to accommodate the number of Senators who wish to be present for the vote on the Hughes amendment on Wednesday, it becomes apparent that, if we could reach an agreement that we would not take up the amendment until 11:30 a.m., it would probably be the most convenient time, thereby bringing it to a final vote at about 1:30 in the afternoon. If that could be arranged with the distinguished Senator from Mississippi and the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) I think it would be convenient, if it is also in keeping with whatever the nature of the objectives might be.

Mr. STENNIS. I think we should not try to change the unanimous consent agreement. All we could do would be to have an understanding that the author of the amendment and the manager of the bill will work to that end. This would leave 2 hours before 3:30, the time for the vote on the Cooper-Hart amendment. The proposal has appeal to me. The Senator from Kentucky is in the Chamber as is the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER). They might have some comment to make.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. I have not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE), but I understood his amendment would be called up subsequent to the amendment of the Senator from Iowa, in which case it would seem to me, considering the time expended to vote, that the Hughes amendment should come up earlier and be voted on Wednesday, but somewhat earlier than 1:30. As I said, I have not had an opportunity to discuss this with the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. HUGHES. The Senator from Iowa is willing to give the Senator an opportunity to speak with the Senator from Massachusetts, or with whomever he wishes, to work toward this end.

The purpose of the colloquy is to see if it is possible if we could bring it up before 11:30.

Mr. TOWER. I understand the agreement specifies no time, except, from the standpoint of debate time, that they should be disposed of prior to the vote set at 3:30 on the Cooper-Hart amendment, as conceivably amended or not amended.

My suggestion is this: It is conceivable that the amendment of the Senator from Iowa and the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts could be brought up in turn and debated, with the vote being postponed until the debate on all amendments has been concluded, and then the debate on each amendment in turn being voted on, arriving at the vote on the Cooper-Hart amendment at, say, 3:30.

Mr. STENNIS. May I call attention to the fact that, although I called it the Brooke amendment, it is altogether different from the Hughes amendment. It is an amendment to the bill; it is not an

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amendment to the Cooper-Hart amendment. The amendment of the Senator from Iowa is an amendment to the Cooper-Hart amendment. I think they are two separate and distinct matters, even though I used the name of the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. TOWER. It was my understanding, though, when we got the consent agreement, that the time on all the amendments would be limited to 1 hour except that there would be a limitation of 2 hours on the amendments of the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Iowa, which would imply that the Senator from Iowa intended it as a substitute or as an amendment to the Cooper-Hart amendment. Otherwise it would not apply here. If it were an amendment to the bill only, it could be brought up at a subsequent time to the vote on the Cooper-Hart amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Massachusetts is in town. Perhaps he should be notified.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) is not present at this time. I understood him to say he would offer his amendment to the bill. Would it be helpful if the Senator from Mississippi, the Senator from Texas, the Senator from Iowa, the Senator from Michigan, and I could meet here at a stated time tomorrow and see if we could work out the schedule for Wednesday's vote in a more satisfactory manner?

Mr. STENNIS. I think so. If it could be done this afternoon, it would be much better, because so many Senators want to know.

Mr. COOPER. At the conclusion of the speech of the Senator from Kansas, I shall try to reach the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE).

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, it makes very little difference to me how it is done. I am simply trying to protect the Senator from Massachusetts. I would like to ascertain whether he intends to offer his amendment prior to the vote on the Cooper-Hart amendment or subsequently. It was my understanding, when the original consent agreement was propounded, that it would be offered as an amendment to the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from Michigan. Otherwise, it would not have been included in the consent agreement.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I wish to make this statement on behalf of the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) and myself.

On August 5, Senators JACKSON and STENNIS raised a question about our amendment No. 819 to the military procurement bill, H.R. 17123. We wish to assert once again, as we did in a press statement that day, that the Hart-Cooper amendment does not restrict the use of the \$365 million requested by the Department of Defense for research and development on Safeguard. It is the view of Senator HART and myself that research and development should be directed toward the deployment of an effective system specifically designed for the protection of the Minuteman deterrent, but our amendment does not compel the De-

partment of Defense to use the research and development funds in this way.

The language of the Hart-Cooper amendment makes this statement clear: that it does not affect or restrict in any way the use of the funds provided in the bill for phase I, including the use of those funds for research, development, testing, and evaluation.

I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the amendment (No. 819) was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMENDMENT No. 819

On page 7, line 1, strike out "\$1,031,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$838,600,000".

On page 16, line 8, strike out "\$322,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$192,800,000".

On page 17, beginning with line 15, strike out all down through line 5 on page 18, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"Sec. 402. (a) No funds appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be obligated or expended in connection with deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic missile system, or any part or component thereof, at any site other than the two sites at which deployment was heretofore authorized by law (Malmstrom Air Force Base, Great Falls, Montana, and Grand Forks Air Force Base, Grand Forks, North Dakota).

"(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to the obligation or expenditure of funds for research, development, testing, and evaluation activities carried out in support of any advanced antiballistic missile program at sites heretofore established for such purpose."

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's viewpoint. I thank him for putting that matter in the RECORD as a part of the history. We will have to refer to that again at an appropriate time.

THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, last year I spoke of the need for authorizing the deployment of the first phase of the Safeguard ABM system. As you recall, the debate of this issue was long and heated. As I said last year:

Spirited debate is inevitable when we are confronted with a problem of such technical magnitude and scientific complexity as our deterrent defense system.

We are now considering an authorization to continue work on the Safeguard system, a step which represents the minimum response to an urgent need.

The President has made a clear and persuasive case for this continuation of Safeguard. As in the past, he has been reasonable, prudent, and realistic in his proposals.

It is unbelievable that the Senate is now trying to handcuff President Nixon in light of what he has achieved in the last 18 months.

First, the President has a plan for peace in Vietnam, and it is working.

Second, an Arab-Israeli ceasefire began Friday night as a result of Mid-East peace proposals prepared by the Nixon administration.

Third, progress is being made at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—begun under the Nixon administration—in Vienna.

In view of these developments, it seems

indefensible that the President's judgment, motives, or wisdom would be questioned now with reference to Safeguard.

CRUCIAL MOMENTUM

Last year, by a narrow majority, authorization was granted to begin work on two sites—Grand Forks Air Force Base, N. Dak., and Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont. That work has begun and much has been accomplished. Most importantly, the Safeguard program has developed the momentum so necessary for the timely and orderly prosecution of the deployment. Thousands of Government and contractor personnel have been employed. Production lines have been established. Site construction has been initiated. Getting all of this started and keeping it going in an orderly, coordinated fashion is no easy job. It is a stupendous management task that, once interrupted, is extremely difficult, costly, and time-consuming to resume.

Just as we have established a momentum with the ABM, so have the Soviets, since 1965, built up a momentum in developing and deploying their strategic offensive force. This momentum is most disturbing as it applies to the installation of the giant SS-9 ICBM. If this momentum continues, we face the prospect in a very few years of a real threat to our Minuteman ICBM force—the backbone of our deterrent.

This year we are considering additional authorization to continue the momentum established by the work already authorized. This authorization, as recommended by the Armed Services Committee, would permit work to continue on the previously authorized sites at Malmstrom and Grand Forks and also authorize full deployment at Whiteman and advanced preparation at Warren Air Force Base. In making its recommendation, the Committee stressed the urgent need to provide for the defense of our land-based deterrent.

THE SAME ISSUE

Mr. President, the issue before us now has not changed from last year. The issue revolves around the strategic reality of our defense posture. The time has again come when the Senate of the United States either gives the President the tools to bring peace and security, or denies them. In this respect, nothing has changed. Nothing has happened since last year to justify altering the course we established then. The threat has not disappeared—it has increased. We do not have an arms limitation agreement with the Russians, and we do not know when we will. We were confident the system would work last year. We are more confident than ever this year of its effectiveness. In short, if there was a valid reason to begin deployment last year, there is certainly a valid reason to continue, uninterrupted, at least the minimum deployment needed to preserve our security.

Now, let us look at some of the more prevalent arguments that have been raised by those who oppose the system.

TECHNICAL CAPABILITY

Perhaps the most frequent charge leveled at Safeguard is the assertion that it will not work, and that the Minute-

DEBATE IN SENATE ON ABM PRESSED

Jackson and Cooper Clash on Merits of Safeguard

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5 —

Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, told the Senate today that the United States must expand the Safeguard antiballistic missile system to counter an "alarming increase" in the Soviet strategic threat.

Senator John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, countered that the Defense Department had now acknowledged that the Safeguard system would be ineffective in defending Minuteman bases against a growing, more sophisticated Soviet missile attack.

The ABM debate was thus finally joined in the Senate between the two leading protagonists — Senator Jackson, a senior member of the Armed Services Committee, who has been assigned the responsibility of defending the Safeguard system, and Senator Cooper, the co-author with Senator Philip A. Hart, Democrat of Michigan, of an amendment that would block the Administration's plan to expand the Safeguard system beyond the two stations authorized last year.

In a debate that is expected to last a week, Senator Jackson said the discussion should revolve around the "central fact" that "The Soviet Union has continued to support, at great cost, a comprehensive, dynamic program of strategic weapons procurement that shows no sign of slowing down."

Soviet Threat Cited

In the last year, he said, "the Soviet threat to our land-based deterrent has significantly increased, at a rate that has exceeded the intelligence projections made a year ago."

Senator Jackson cited the continuing Soviet deployment of the large SS-9 missiles, the smaller SS-11 Intercontinental missiles and construction of missile-carrying nuclear submarines.

As a result, he argued in a speech that set forth the basic case of the ABM proponents, further deployment of the Safeguard system "is more desirable and necessary than ever" if the United States is to maintain the "credibility" of its nuclear deterrent force.

Senator Jackson also raised the Administration's "bargaining chip" argument by stating that continued deployment of Safeguard was "an essential condition" if the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union are to succeed.

"If the Senate stops the forward motion of the Safeguard program," Senator Jackson asked, "what are our negotiators in the SALT talks going to offer the Russians as an inducement to stop building their SS-9's?"

The Cooper rebuttal — and one that has now become the principal technical argument of the ABM opposition — is that Safeguard as presently designed, will not counter the Soviet threat and that therefore instead of expanding Safeguard the United States should start developing an ABM system specifically designed to protect the deterrent force of Minuteman Missiles.

Cooper Presses Criticism

"What we are arguing," Senator Cooper told Senator Jackson, "is that if the SALT talks fail and if the Soviets continue to deploy SS-9's and the other missiles you mention, then in the name of the security of this country, it would be a mistake, indeed a dereliction to spend all this money on a system which the Department of Defense now says will not work if this threat continues to grow."

In support of this contention, Senator Cooper cited recently published Congressional testimony by Army officials to the effect that Safeguard would be inadequate and too costly to defend the Minuteman bases against "a greatly enlarged and more sophisticated Soviet threat" than now foreseen for the 1975 period.

As a result, the Army officials in charge of the Safeguard program disclosed that there has been a recent decision to develop an ABM system, code-named Hardsite, that would be particularly designed for providing terminal defense for the Minuteman missile bases.

AGM

THE WASHINGTON POST

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Pentagon Confirms New Russian Test of Round-the-World Missile System

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon confirmed yesterday that the Russians have resumed flight testing of a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, a long-range missile that rises to the fringes of space but is brought back to a target on earth before completing one orbit.

FOBS tests began in 1966, though they were not announced at the time by either the United States or the Soviet Union. Some officials in this country have long considered continued testing of the weapon to be a violation of the spirit of the 1963 treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from outer space, although not a technical violation.

By taking the long way around via the Southern Hemisphere, such a weapon could avoid American early warning radars guarding our northern approaches.

Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said the most recent launch occurred at the missile test center at Tyuratam in Southern Russia. He estimated that the payload could equal a three-megaton warhead.

He said the payload, after a 90-minute flight, re-entered the earth's atmosphere just north of the Caspian Sea and just shy of completing a single orbit.

Friedheim, in confirming that last Tuesday's flight of

Cosmos 354 was part of the FOBS program, said that the Soviet Union has held "at least one test a year of this type since 1967," when the program was first disclosed publicly by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

Actually, the Soviet Union has conducted at least 15 of these tests since 1966, according to highly authoritative government sources.

The first two in 1966 were

not reported. Nine more took place in 1967, which defense analysts believe was a period of peak development. Two more were conducted in 1968, and one last fall. The first of this year came last Tuesday.

Resumption of FOBS testing after about a nine-month hiatus is certain to raise questions both at Vienna, where U.S. and Soviet negotiators are trying to piece together an arms limitation agreement among two superpowers with dissimilar weapon systems, and in the Senate, where a \$19.2 billion military spending authorization faces a tough battle.

Some defense analysts believe that FOBS is already considered an operational weapon by Soviet leaders and that the very infrequent shots of the past three years are primarily for crew training and testing purposes. Others contend that the Soviets no longer have much faith in the idea, and that they launch one or two a year just to keep the United States on edge and to force us to spend money on bolstering defenses against a phantom threat.

Friedheim viewed the latest Soviet shot as "evidence of the continuing momentum of the Soviet development and test program for strategic weapons."

Weapons experts in this country have always consid-

ered FOBS to be a bad investment, contending it is much less accurate than ICBM and therefore no good for hitting small, well-protected military targets. The sophisticated equipment needed to get FOBS out of orbit and onto targets also reduces the size of its warhead. The weapon, which is launched aboard the huge SS-9 booster, is, however, considered to be a threat to U.S. bomber bases.